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Résumé
S’appuyant sur une méthodologie
inspirée des œuvres de Michel Fou-
cault, l’auteur trace une « généalo-
gie » du cadre juridique régissant les
tests de dépistage de drogues en
droit du travail canadien. Cela le
mène à la conclusion que les origi-
nes du régime canadien se trouvent
dans la « War on Drugs » aux États-
Unis pendant les années 1980. Des
éléments clés du modèle canadien
de dépistage de drogues, telle sa
justification comme moyen de ré-
duire les accidents de travail, sem-
blent avoir migré au Canada, malgré
l’absence d’intervention législative.
L’auteur propose d’expliquer cette
migration avec la métaphore du virus.
Enfin, il suggère qu’une recherche
future qui mobiliserait cette méta-
phore pourrait générer un modèle
explicatif applicable à d’autres phé-
nomènes de migration juridique.
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Abstract
Drawing on a methodology inspired
by the work of Michel Foucault, the
author traces a “genealogy” of the
legal framework governing employ-
ment drug testing in Canada. This
exercise leads him to claim that the
origins of the Canadian regime can
be found in the “War on Drugs” in
the United States during the 1980s.
Key aspects of the Canadian model
of drug testing, including its justifi-
cation as a method of reducing
workplace injuries, appear to have
migrated to Canada, despite an
absence of legislative intervention.
The author proposes the metaphor
of a virus to explain this migration
and suggests that further work on
this metaphor may generate an
explanatory model for other phe-
nomena of legal norm migration.
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Mandatory drug testing of employees has increased significantly
in prevalence among Canadian enterprises, both public and private.
Up until the mid-1980s, drug testing was essentially absent from
the Canadian industrial relations landscape1. Through the 1990s,
the prevalence of drug testing in Canada increased, and by 2001,
approximately one in fifty Canadian employees were required to
undergo drug tests as a condition of hiring2. Unsurprisingly, as drug
testing has increased in prevalence it has become a significant issue
in Canadian labour and employment law.
Since the early decisions rendered in the 1980s, a consensus
has emerged in the arbitral jurisprudence regarding the scope of
allowable drug testing, crystallizing into what is now routinely
referred to as “the Canadian model”3. This model – and in particular
its mobilization of the notion of “safety sensitive positions” as a key
component of the legal justification for mandatory drug testing – is
the subject of this paper.
My principal argument is that the Canadian model is not really
Canadian at all. In virtually all respects, the so-called Canadian
model is in fact the U.S. model. I will show how the legal norms gov-
erning employment drug testing in Canada, and in particular the
1 For example, an exhaustive study of the Québec jurisprudence on alcohol and
drug use in the workplace, published in 1984, devotes only three paragraphs to
“testing”. The paragraphs refer solely to breath testing for alcohol and makes no
mention of urinalysis testing for other substances. See Claude D’AOUST & Sylvain
ST-JEAN, Les manquements du salarié associés à l’alcool et aux drogues: étude
jurisprudentielle et doctrinale, Montréal, École des relations industrielles de l’Uni-
versité de Montréal, monographie n˚ 17, 1984, p. 37-38.
2 Ernest B. AKYEAMPONG, “Screening Job Applicants”, (2006) 7 Perspectives 5 (Sta-
tistics Canada Catalogue no. 75-001-XIE), 9-10 (the figure cited is 2.2%). The
study is based on data from the Workplace and Employee Survey conducted by
Statistics Canada in 2000 and 2001. In some industries, the figure is much
higher (9.2% for the primary product manufacturing sector. Id., 9). These fig-
ures are much lower than comparable estimates for the United States, where
survey data for the same year indicates that 48% of employees report some form
of drug testing (see UNITED STATES SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES
ADMINISTRATION, Awareness of Workplace Substance Use Policies and Programs,
NHSDA Report, September 27, 2002, p. 2). As in Canada, the figure is much
higher for the manufacturing sector (67.5%. Id., p. 3, Figure 4).
3 See e.g. Re Imperial Oil and C.E.P. Local 900, (2006) 157 L.A.C. (4th) 225, 88
C.L.A.S. 273 (Quicklaw), ¶ 100 ff (M.G. Picher) (Ont. Labour Arbitration) [here-
inafter “Imperial Oil” cited to C.L.A.S.].
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primary justification for allowing testing – that it is a means to
reduce workplace accidents – are the result of a migration of Amer-
ican legal norms. In doing so, I will demonstrate that the workplace
accident justification was not the initial reason for which drug test-
ing was implemented. Rather, the initial reasons were part of a larger
moral discourse that itself created the possibility of a justification
that relates drug testing to safety. 
The adoption of the Canadian model occurred with little refer-
ence to the U.S. experience and it is difficult to account for this phe-
nomenon solely with reference to conventional explanations of norm
migration. I propose the metaphor of a virus to explain how Cana-
dian law was initially “infected” with the American norms, which
subsequently replicated and spread throughout the jurisprudence.
Infection requires a suitable host and we will see how Canadian
human rights law was suitable insofar as its structure allows for the
safety justification. In order to authorize prima facie violations of
fundamental rights in Canada, a particular kind of justification
must be given; the structure of this justification appears in the “bona
fide occupational requirement” test4. Because of this, safety is the
strongest and perhaps only acceptable argument for mandatory drug
testing; provided, of course, that a relationship between drug test-
ing and workplace accidents can be proven.
I. Preliminary Comments 
A. Scope
As indicated, this investigation is limited to the justification of
workplace drug testing within the Canadian jurisprudence. Unsur-
prisingly drug testing raises a number of other legal questions which
are, to varying degrees, related to this justification. For instance,
the admissibility of drug test results in arbitration or other litigation
will likely depend, at least in part, on the right of the employer to have
required the test in the first place. Likewise, the enforceability of so-
called “last-chance” or “back-to-work” agreements – whereby employ-
4 Also called the “Meiorin test” after the name of the grievor in British Columbia
(Public Service Employee Relations Commission) v. B.C.G.S.E.U., [1999] 3 S.C.R.
3, 176 D.L.R. (4th) 1 [hereinafter “Meiorin”], where the test is set out.
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ees with substance-abuse problems affecting their work perform-
ance are given a final opportunity to keep their employment subject
to specific conditions – often depends in part on whether the employer
has the right to require drug tests5. These and other questions raise
distinct issues that merit in-depth analysis in their own right; that
is not the purpose of this paper.
The increasing prevalence of workplace drug testing can also be
situated within the context of a general trend towards surveillance
in the workplace, which can itself be explained in terms of the evo-
lution of mechanisms of employer power or social control generally6.
Again, these are important questions that deserve their own treat-
ment; where I refer to them, it is only tangentially7.
Finally, this investigation is primarily concerned with the legal
justification for urinalysis drug testing for illegal drugs. This is for
5 On these agreements generally, see Joan MCEWEN, “Addressing Chemical
Dependency-Related Issues in the Workplace: A Proposed Model for Workplace
Health and Productivity”, (1994) 2(3) Can. Lab. L.J. 421, 431-433; Susan CHARL-
TON, “Trade Union Concerns about Substance Abuse in the Workplace”, (1994)
2(3) Can. Lab. L.J. 439, 443-444. On the right to test within the context of these
agreements, see Catherine WEDGE, “Limitations on Alcohol and Drug Testing in
Collective Bargaining Relationships”, (1994) 2(3) Can. Lab. L.J. 461, 480-482.
On the relative (un)usefulness of the jurisprudence regarding these agreements
to the question of drug testing generally, see Rhéaume PERREAULT & Simon-
Pierre PAQUETTE, “Le Dépistage d’alcool et de drogues en entreprise: où en som-
mes-nous?”, in Service de la formation continue, Barreau du Québec, vol. 267,
Développements récents en droit du travail (2007), Cowansville, Éditions Yvon
Blais.
6 See e.g. John GILLIOM, Surveillance, Privacy, and the Law: Employee Drug Test-
ing and the Politics of Social Control, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press,
1994; Elinore P. SCHROEDER, “On Beyond Drug Testing: Employer Monitoring
and the Quest for the Perfect Worker”, (1988) 36 Kansas Law Review 869; H.J.
GLASBEEK & David MCROBERT, “Privatizing Discipline – The Case of Mandatory
Drug Testing”, (1989) 9 Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 30; F.A. HANSON, “Some Social
Implications of Drug Testing”, (1988) 36 Kansas Law Review 899; Eugene
OSCAPELLA, “Drug Testing and Privacy ‘Are You Now, Or Have You Ever Been, A
Member Of The Communist Party?’ McCarthyism, Early 1950’s – ‘Are You Know,
Or Have You Ever Been, A User Of Illicit Drugs?’ Chemical McCarthyism, 1990s”,
(1994) 2(3) Can. Lab. L.J. 325; James R. BRUNET, “Employee Drug Testing as
Social Control: A Typology of Normative Justifications”, (2002) 22(3) Review of
Public Personnel Administration 193.
7 See note 24, infra.
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the simple reason that it is by far the most widespread kind of test-
ing done by employers. Though the exclusion of prescription and
“over the counter” medications from many policies indicates that
testing is motivated by something other than reducing impairment
at work, I do not discuss the question here. Nor do I discuss other
forms biological testing, such as blood, hair, and saliva testing. Each
of these methods has its own set of possibilities and limitations,
some of which differ significantly from urine testing. I will not be
providing a detailed analysis of the legality of each of these meth-
ods. Thus, unless I specify otherwise in the text, when I refer to “drug
testing” I should be taken to mean “urinalysis testing for illegal
drugs”.
B. Methodology and Theoretical Approach
The methodology that I employ in looking at the justification for
drug testing is not purely positivist. By this, I mean that I will not
analyse the jurisprudence solely on the basis of its internal coher-
ence and its conformity with established legal rules8. This is not to
say that I will not endeavour to interrogate these questions – in fact
my analysis of the Canadian model pays detailed attention to the
applicable legal rules and doctrines.
1. Law as Discourse, the Genealogical Approach 
and the Viral Metaphor
Where I venture beyond a “positivist” analysis is in my descent
into the history of the safety justification in general and the notion of
“safety sensitive positions” in particular. Following Michel Foucault,
8 In reference to H.L.A. Hart’s famous footnote where he describes five meanings
of “positivism” that have been “bandied about in contemporary jurisprudence”,
I mean that I will not limit myself to the perspective that “the analysis (or study
of the meaning) of legal concepts is… to be distinguished from historical enquir-
ies into the causes or origins of laws, from sociological inquiries into the relation
of law and other social phenomena, and from the criticism of law, whether in
terms of morals, social aims, ‘functions’ or otherwise.” (Hart’s 3rd definition). Nor
do I limit myself to the position that “a legal system is a ‘closed logical system’ in
which correct legal decisions can be deduced by logical means from predeter-
mined legal rules without reference to social aims, policies, moral standards.”
(Hart’s 4th definition). Cited from Herbert Lionel Adolphus HART, “Positivism and
the Separation of Law and Morals”, (1958) 71-4 Harvard Law Review 593, 601-
602, note 25.
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I propose a genealogical approach. This approach rests upon a series
of presuppositions that I don’t have the intention of defending here,
but that bear mentioning explicitly. 
First, I assume that legal texts form part of a discourse, that is,
“a limited number of statements for which we can define a series of
conditions of existence”9. Hence my interest in the question of how
statements such as “drug testing helps reduce workplace accidents”
become legal statements within the formal structure of justification. 
Second, I assume that within legal discourse, the “truth” of a
statement is not determined purely by reference to its conformity
with some metaphysical objective state of affairs, but by its rela-
tionship to other statements, both within legal discourse itself and
in other discourses, such as scientific discourse. It follows that the
“truth” of a statement is not a static and atemporal property that
can be ascribed to it, but rather the effect of other statements; there
is thus in principle a point at which a statement became true (each
statement has, in other words, its “moment of truth”). Foucault, par-
aphrasing Nietzsche, describes genealogy as the search for the “fac-
tories” in which truths were “manufactured”10.
When I say that I am doing a “genealogy”, what I mean is that I
want to trace back some of the propositions that appear in the Cana-
dian model. But rather than seek their origins in some foundational
moment, I want to show their relationship to other propositions at
other times and in other places. This is not very different from the
standard notion of genealogy, which is a kind of “descent” into the
past11. When one traces a family tree, one is not doing history per
se; it is rather a question of following relationships backwards. In
fact, by definition, the farther one traces a family tree, the more orig-
inating nodes are uncovered. Conceiving of genealogy in this way
has the following advantages:
9 Michel FOUCAULT, L’archéologie du savoir, Paris, Gallimard, 1969, p. 153. My
translation from: “…un nombre limité d’énoncés pour lesquels on peut définir
un ensemble de conditions d’existence.”
10 Michel FOUCAULT, “La vérité et les formes juridiques”, in Michel FOUCAULT, Dits et
écrits, tome 1: 1954-1975, Paris, Gallimard, 2001, p. 1406, at p. 1408-1421,
esp. 1412.
11 On the replacement of “origins” with “descent” in genealogy, see Michel FOUCAULT,
“Nietzsche, la généalogie, l’histoire”, in Michel FOUCAULT, Dits et écrits, tome II:
1976-1988, Paris, Gallimard, 2002, p. 143.
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“Recasting origins as ‘descent’ enables one to think of difference
rather than resemblance, of beginnings rather than a beginning, of
exterior accident rather than internal truth. Searching for descent
is, according to Foucault, the opposite of erecting foundations; it is
to disturb the immobile, fragment the unified and show the heter-
ogeneity of what was thought to be consistent.”12
This captures precisely my contention: that the Canadian model
is not a simple jurisprudential development based on the internal
logic of Canadian law, but rather the descendent of a previous expe-
rience with multiple beginnings. 
The genealogical approach is also consistent with the metaphor
of viral norm migration. Two typical explanations of norm migration
– transplant13 and harmonization14 – are predicated upon the exist-
ence of explicit efforts to import or export norms, which can be
described in terms of a unified process that develops according to a
linear logic departing from an identifiable moment. The spread of a
virus, however, is better described in terms of a multiplicity of points
of infection, which occur at different moments. The time and place
of each transmission may be radically contingent and there is no a
priori reason to expect that the spread can be described in terms of
any form of relationship between them.
Though I don’t have the intention of providing a detailed defence
of these theoretical presuppositions, it may be useful if I provide
some assurance regarding their validity. By claiming that legal state-
ments are “truth effects” I am not proposing some sort of radical rel-
ativism or arguing that there is no such thing as truth. All I am
claiming is that within legal discourse, the provenance of a statement
is intrinsically linked to its truth. Lawyers work within this frame-
work all the time; it is the very basis of the notion of stare decisis.
Whatever fictions the ideology of the common law puts in place, no
12 Michèle BARRETT, The Politics of Truth: From Marx to Foucault, Stanford, Stanford
University Press, 1991, at p. 132.
13 Colonization provides a paradigm case, but transplant can include the adoption
of foreign norms by a sovereign legislature, as in Québec’s adoption of the com-
mon law instrument of the trust (art. 1260-1298 C.c.Q.).
14 For example, UNCITRAL (United Nations Commission on International Trade
Law) and the NCCUSL (National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws, which is largely responsible for the U.S. Uniform Commercial Code), both
of which have as explicit objectives the modification of local norms so as to pro-
vide for their uniformity. 
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lawyer would seriously contend that the statement, “The defendant
is only liable in contract for the plaintiff’s losses if they are generally
foreseeable or if the damages resulting from the breach were con-
templated by the parties” was true in any significant sense of the word
before the Court of Exchequer decided so in 1854. When Baron
Alderson rendered the decision in Hadley v. Baxendale15, it became
true.
2. On the Distinction Between Reasons and Justifications
My analysis mobilizes the distinction between reasons and jus-
tifications. In particular, I argue that the initially stated reasons for
which drug testing was adopted in the U.S. are different from the
justifications that were provided during and after its implementa-
tion. Furthermore, I claim that these later justifications became in
turn the reasons for implementing drug testing in Canada. Though
I don’t think that my broader claims in this paper stand or fall on
the validity of the distinction, the way in which I intend to use these
two terms bears some explanation.
A reason for acting is an intentional state related to motivation,
which in turn implies an objective. Thus, the reason that (as the
joke goes) the chicken crossed the road was that he wanted to get to
the other side. His objective was getting to the other side of the road,
and prior to his action he formed an intention to so, probably based
on the belief that crossing the road was one way to achieve his objec-
tive16.
In contrast, a justification is a legitimating explanation for action.
Thus, the chicken might have any number of justifications for cross-
ing the road. For instance, he might say: “There is no law against
crossing the road and absent such a prohibition I was free to do as
I liked” (a libertarian justification). Or, he might say: “Road-crossing
is the duty of all chickens” (a deontological justification). In principle,
the number of possible justifications the chicken could give is lim-
itless.
15 9 Exch. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
16 What is described here is what John Searle calls “internal reasons” as opposed
to “external reasons”. There might be a series of reasons that militate in favour
of crossing the road, but they are not necessarily his (the chicken’s) reasons.
See John R. SEARLE, Rationality in Action, Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 2001.
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From this (admittedly silly) example, we can draw a number of
conclusions, of which I am interested in two. First, having had a
reason to do something (within the meaning stipulated above) is a
factual question. The intentional states of actors might be hard (or
even impossible) to discern, but there is in principle a “fact of the
matter”. Somebody who said the chicken crossed the road because
he wanted to feel the pavement on his feet would not be giving a “bad”
reason, they would simply be wrong. Conversely, justifications are
normative rather than factual. We might say that the chicken’s jus-
tification is “bad” or “weak” or “illegitimate” but we can’t say that it
is wrong.
Second, reasons and justifications have a different temporal
logic. A reason must be formed prior to (or arguably during) an action.
We can’t retroactively change our reasons for having done some-
thing. Justifications, on the other hand, are admissible regardless of
when they are constructed, and they are subject to change. Even if
my justification is erected post hoc, this does not render it any less
of a justification.
This relatively simple distinction is complicated by the fact that
often justifications cite reasons17. For instance, the first part of the
“bona fide occupational requirement” test discussed above is pre-
cisely that the impugned standard has been adopted for a purpose
rationally connected to the performance of the job. In other words,
for the standard to be justified the employer must have had a good
reason to adopt it18. Note, however, that the fact that many justifi-
cations for actions rely on their antecedent reasons does not col-
lapse the distinction.
A further complication arises from the very nature of reasons as
I have defined them; they are necessarily private. If a reason is an
intentional state, then there is no infallible way to verify it. This doesn’t
mean that we don’t have any access to others’ reasons. A common
way to discover them is that the person simply tells us what their
17 According to Kant, an action is only justified if it is done for the right reasons. 
18 See also the “Oakes test” set out in R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, ¶ 69: “To
establish that a limit is reasonable and demonstrably justified in a free and dem-
ocratic society, two central criteria must be satisfied. First, the objective, which the
measures responsible for a limit on a Charter right or freedom are designed to
serve, must be ‘of sufficient importance to warrant overriding a constitutionally
protected right or freedom’.” (emphasis added, citations omitted).
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reasons for acting were (often in the context of a justification). Of
course, people may be deceitful in describing their reasons for act-
ing, but this does nothing to weaken the distinction between rea-
sons and justifications. In any case, given my focus on discourse, I
am concerned with stated reasons and their relationship to justifi-
cations.
A final complication arises from the fact that we often have more
than one reason for a particular action. This problem is compounded
when reasons are imputed to an institution that has adopted a
course of action, since there may be many people who participated
in elaborating the reasons for acting (and each of them may have
had more than one reason). Again, since I am interested in stated rea-
sons, this is of little consequence for my argument.
II. Safety Sensitive Positions: A Genealogy
A. American Context
As we shall see below, the advent of employment drug testing in
Canada cannot be understood without reference to its prior imple-
mentation in the United States. In this section, I will provide a brief
overview of the history of drug testing in U.S. I will then examine the
stated reasons for the broad scale implementation of employment
drug testing, with particular reference to President Reagan’s Execu-
tive Order 12564, which mandated drug testing across the federal
civil service. This order, and the regulations, policies, and procedures
that it engendered, became the template for employment drug test-
ing across the U.S., including in the private sector. 
1. The “Pre-history” of Employment Drug Testing 
in the United States
The idea of urine examination as a diagnostic tool can be traced
back to Hippocrates19. However, the earliest drug testing in the U.S.
19 Meryl H. HABER, “Pisse prophecy: A brief history of urinalysis”, (1988) 8:3 Clinics
in Laboratory Medicine 415, cited in Deborah L. ACKERMAN, “A History of Drug
Testing”, in Robert H. COOMBS and Louis Jolyon WEST (eds.), Drug Testing: Issues
and Options, New York, Oxford University Press, 1991, p. 3 [hereinafter “History
of Drug Testing”], at p. 6. See also, J. GILLIOM, supra, note 6, at p. 5.
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was based on blood and breath. In the 1920s, blood and breath
samples were used to identify drunk drivers; with the first “war on
drugs” came the first use of biological screening for drugs20. It was
only in the 1950s that techniques were developed that allowed for
large-scale urinalysis screening for drugs. Until the late 1960s, this
technique was limited to medical uses, for instance in hospital emer-
gency rooms and psychiatric outpatient clinics21.
Among the first populations to be subjected to mass urinalysis
screening was that of veterans returning from the Vietnam War22.
These tests were implemented due to the concern that many soldiers
were returning from Vietnam addicted to opium or heroin. Conse-
quently, morphine (the metabolite excreted in urine subsequent to
opiate use) was the only drug for which testing was implemented23. 
The returning Vietnam veterans programme was eventually
extended to the entire military, which was the first State institution
to perform testing on all of its members24. In early 1982, the U.S.
Navy became the first branch of the armed services to put into prac-
tice a comprehensive, mandatory, mass-screening programme. Safety
was an oft-repeated justification25, but the following quote from (then)
20 History of Drug Testing, supra, note 19, at p. 8.
21 Id., at p. 11.
22 Olympic athletes became subject to testing at about the same time: the first
testing occurred on a preliminary basis at the 1968 Olympics in Mexico City and
the first comprehensive testing being done at the 1972 Olympics in Munich. See
Eric D. ZEMPER, “Drug Testing in Athletics”, in R.H. COOMBS and L.J. WEST (eds.),
supra, note 19, p. 113, at p. 114.
23 History of Drug Testing, supra, note 19, at p. 11.
24 Id., at p. 12. Prisons began testing at about the same time. This is telling, since
the military and prisons were identified by Foucault as two “disciplinary” insti-
tutions par excellence, arguing that they functioned based on a power logic of
surveillance. See Michel FOUCAULT, Surveiller et punir, Paris, Gallimard, 1975.
The other two disciplinary institutions identified by Foucault are the workplace
and schools. In the 1980s, at about the same time mass employment testing
was instituted, mass testing of highschool students begun. In Vernonia School
District v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995), the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that man-
datory testing for students who participate in extra-curricular activities does
not violate their rights under the 4th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
25 An aircraft crash that killed 14 people on the carrier U.S.S. Nimitz is often cited as
the event that triggered the decision for the Navy to implement mass-screening,
implying that safety was a primary reason (see e.g. Dennis J. CROUCH et al., “A
Critical Evaluation of the Utah Power and Light Company’s Substance Abuse
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Rear Admiral Paul Malloy, who initiated the programme, states other
reasons:
“In discussions with the CNO [Chief of Naval Operations], I recom-
mended that “war” be declared on drugs with all that the phrase
clearly implied. I believed that after Vietnam, sailors’ values were
confused about things such as right/wrong; legal/illegal; tradi-
tional beliefs in God, family and country; and the Navy’s customs
and traditions. Historically, all these things promoted pride, high
morale, and sound discipline. We believed drug usage in the Navy
reflected not only a societal malady but also an erosion of our tra-
ditional values…”26
This concern with “traditional values” was a key stated reason
for the “War on Drugs” initiated by President Reagan in the 1980s.
It is the mobilization of the rhetoric of values as a reason for employ-
ment testing that we will now turn to.
2. The “War on Drugs” and the President’s Report
of the Committee on Organized Crime
The concern that drug use was both a symptom and a cause of
the decline of “traditional values” was an important stated reason
guiding U.S. drug policy during the Reagan presidency. On October 2,
1982, Reagan declared “War on Drugs” in his weekly radio address
to the nation27. In the address, drug use is characterized as an “epi-
26 P.J. MULLOY, id., at p. 95.
27 Ronald W. REAGAN, “Radio Address to the Nation on Federal Drug Policy, Octo-
ber 2, 1982”, in The Public Papers of President Ronald W. Reagan, Ronald Reagan
Presidential Library, at <http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/
1982/100282a.htm> (accessed Nov. 21, 2007) [hereinafter “Reagan’s Radio
Address to the Nation”]. “War” had actually already been declared almost ten
years earlier by then President Richard Nixon. In an address to Congress regard-
ing the establishment of the Drug Enforcement Agency, Nixon stated: “Drug
abuse is one of the most vicious and corrosive forces attacking the foundations
Management Program: Absenteeism, Accidents and Costs”, in Steven W. GUST,
J. Michael WALSH and NIDA (eds.), Drugs in the workplace: research and evalu-
ation data, Rockville, Md., Washington, D.C., U.S. Dept. of Health and Human
Services, Public Health Service, Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health Admin-
istration, National Institute on Drug Abuse, Supt. of Docs., U.S. G.P.O., 1989,
p. 169, at p. 178. However, according to those who actually made the decision,
the decision to test was made several months before the crash (Paul J. MULLOY,
“Winning the War on Drugs in the Military”, in R.H. COOMBS and L.J. WEST (eds.),
supra, note 19, p. 92, at p. 93-94).
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demic” that has a deleterious effect on families. Reagan cites “sto-
ries of families where lying replaces trust, hate replaces love; stories
of children stealing from their mothers’ purses…”28
The War on Drugs was part of a larger anti-crime and “law and
order” initiative of the U.S. government under Reagan29. In mid-1983,
as part of this initiative, Reagan issued an executive order establish-
ing the President’s Commission on Organized Crime30. The Com-
mission’s mandate was to make a “full and complete… analysis of
organized crime” including “the sources and amounts of organized
crime’s income”31. It was then to report its findings to the President
and the Attorney-General and “…make recommendations concern-
ing appropriate administrative and legislative improvements and
improvements in the administration of justice”32.
The Commission came to the conclusion that the primary source
of income for organized crime was drug trafficking; its final report
was entitled America’s Habit: Drug Abuse, Drug Trafficking, and
Organized Crime33. An important finding of the Commission was that,
historically, U.S. drug policy had been oriented towards reducing
28 Reagan’s Radio Address to the Nation, supra, note 27. For other examples of
Reagan’s citation of the relationship between traditional values (or “family val-
ues”) and drug use as a reason for drug policy see “Radio Address to the Nation
on Teenage Drug Abuse, January 16, 1988”; “Address Before a Joint Session of
Congress on the State of the Union January 25, 1988”; “Remarks Upon Arrival
in Palos Hills, Illinois, November 4, 1988” (all in The Public Papers of President
Ronald W. Reagan, supra, note 27).
29 On the relationship between the law and order agenda, the drug war, and
employment drug testing, see J. GILLIOM, supra, note 6, p. 31-33.
30 Executive Order 12435, 48 F.R. 34723 (August 1, 1983).
31 Id., s. 2 (a).
32 Id. 
33 UNITED STATES PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON ORGANIZED CRIME, America’s Habit: Drug
Abuse, Drug Trafficking, and Organized Crime: Report to the President and the
Attorney General, Washington, Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1986.
of American society today. It is a major cause of crime and a merciless destroyer
of human lives. We must fight it with all of the resources at our command. This
Administration has declared all-out, global war on the drug menace…” Richard
NIXON, “Message to the Congress Transmitting Reorganization Plan 2 of 1973
Establishing the Drug Enforcement Administration, March 28th, 1973”, in
John T. WOOLLEY & Gerhard PETERS, The American Presidency Project, Santa
Barbara, University of California, at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/
?pid=4159> (accessed Nov. 27, 2007).
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the supply of drugs, notably by attempting to stop their entry into
the U.S. and by the domestic repression of drug cultivation, man-
ufacture and distribution. The Commission came to the conclusion
that this focus on supply was inefficient and largely ineffective in
reducing “the drug problem”34. Instead, the Federal government
should refocus its efforts on demand reduction35.
As part of this demand reduction strategy, the Commission sug-
gested that the workplace was a useful site of intervention. Oddly
enough, it is here, in a section that deals with demand reduction in
a document that deals with organized crime, and not workplace
safety, that we find one of the initial sources of the notion “safety
sensitive position”, as it was later to be articulated. The Commission
stated:
“Efforts to combat drug abuse can also be successful in the work-
place… Drug testing in certain “critical positions,” such as in the
transportation industry, law enforcement, and education is partic-
ularly important.”36
In the citation, the use of quotes around “critical positions” is
ambiguous, and there are no references in the report that elucidate
what this phrase refers to. It is clearly not intended to refer simply
to workplace safety, however, given the reference to education work-
ers.
Whatever the intended scope of “critical positions” in the Com-
mission’s report, its recommendations unambiguously advocates
employment drug testing as part of its preferred strategy of demand
34 Id., p. 429.
35 Id., p. 187-188 and 204. Interestingly, this is the same position Reagan held,
even prior to declaring the “War on Drugs”. Two months into his presidency, at
the first press conference in which he was asked whether he intended to have a
White House drug strategy, he said: “It is my belief, firm belief, that the answer
to the drug problem comes through winning over the users to the point that we
take the customers away from the drugs... [I]t’s far more effective if you take the
customers away than if you try to take the drugs away from those who want to
be customers.” “The President’s News Conference, March 6, 1981”, in The Public
Papers of President Ronald W. Reagan, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, at
<http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1981/30681a.htm> (accessed
Nov. 21, 2007).
36 UNITED STATES PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON ORGANIZED CRIME, supra, note 33, p. 461.
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reduction. In the section “Reducing Demand for Drugs”, three rec-
ommendations stand out:
“3. The President should direct the heads of all Federal agencies to
formulate immediately clear policy statements, with implementing
guidelines, including suitable drug testing programs, expressing
the utter unacceptability of drug abuse by Federal employees…
Government contracts should not be awarded to companies that
fail to implement drug programs, including suitable drug testing...
...
7. Every employer, public and private, and public education insti-
tutions of all levels should have clearly-stated policies prohibiting
drug use, possession of drugs, or being under the influence of drugs
on their premises. The consequences of violating these prohibi-
tions should be clearly explained.
8. Government and private sector employer who do not already
require drug testing of job applicants and current employees should
consider the appropriateness of such a testing program.”37
The Commission’s report is not at all clear on exactly how drug
testing is supposed to reduce demand for drugs, other than as part
of a general policy of intolerance towards drug use. Perhaps they
believed that the relationship was so obvious that it need not be
stated. One commentator on drug testing describes it as follows:
“Testing threatens millions of Americans with the speedy, inexpen-
sive infliction of a sanction – unemployment – that has far more
sting than the criminal penalties usually imposed for casual drug
use. As a deterrent, employment testing can be extremely effective,
regardless of its relation to on-the-job performance.”38
3. The Beginnings of a Safety Discourse
During the three years that the President’s Commission was
doing its work, drug testing had begun to appear in American indus-
try, both private and public. By 1985, at least some major corpora-
37 Id., p. 483-485 (emphasis added).
38 Stephen J. SCHULHOFER, “On the Fourth Amendment Rights of the Law-Abiding
Public”, (1989) Supreme Court Review 87, at 129, cited in J. GILLIOM, supra, note 6,
at p. 33.
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tions were conducting pre-employment screening “with the stated
motive of promoting occupational safety”39.
During the same period, the exact phrase “safety-sensitive posi-
tions” made its first appearance. In July of 1983, the U.S. Depart-
ment of Transport Federal Railroad Administration (the “FRA”)
issued a notice setting out its intention to adopt regulations per-
taining to alcohol and drugs in the railroad industry40. In August of
1985, after a series of consultations with industry and employee
representatives, the FRA promulgated a new set of regulations enti-
tled Control of Alcohol and Drug Use in Railroad Operations41. The
reasons for adopting the regulations were that, in the view of the
FRA, “alcohol and drug use result in safety risks and consequences
that are unacceptable”42. Consequently, the FRA announced that
“[t]he time has come for the issuance of a clear Federal prohibition
on the job-related use or possession of alcohol and other drugs by
employees engaged in safety-sensitive functions”43.
The Railroad Regulations operate on the principle that authority
for mandatory drug testing is based on “reasonable cause to ques-
tion the fitness of an employee engaged in a safety-sensitive func-
tion”44. Reasonable cause, within the meaning of the regulations,
comprises not only reasonable suspicion that the employee is in
fact impaired, but the occurrence of an accident45. The regulations
also provide for the mandatory pre-employment screen of all retained
job applicants destined to be engaged in safety-sensitive functions46.
In 1988, the Railroad Regulations were amended to provide for ran-
dom testing of all persons occupying safety-sensitive positions47.
39 Jacques NORMAND, Richard O. LEMPERT & Charles P. O’BRIEN, Under the Influence?:
Drugs and the American Work Force, Washington, National Academy Press, 1994,
p. 175. See also Michael J. WALSH & Jeanne G. TRUMBLE, “The Politics of Drug
Testing”, in R.H. COOMBS and L.J. WEST (eds.), supra, note 19, p. 22, at p. 30-31.
40 48 F.R. 30723 (July 5, 1983).
41 50 F.R. 31508 (August 2, 1985) [hereinafter, the “Railroad Regulations”].
42 Id., 31515.
43 Id., 31534.
44 Id., 31552.
45 Provided for at 49 CFR § 219.301 (referenced in the Railroad Regulations, 31573).
46 49 C.F.R. § 219.501 (referenced in the Railroad Regulations, 31577).
47 Random Drug Testing; Amendments to Alcohol/Drug Regulations, 53 F.R. 47102
(November 21, 1988).
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Though the phrases “safety-sensitive position” and “safety-sensitive
function” occur repeatedly in the voluminous material preceding
the actual provisions of the regulations, they do not appear in the
regulations themselves. Thus, in order to define “safety-sensitive”, one
must look to the population of employees covered by the regulations
(which, recall, are predicated on the idea that they only apply to
those occupying such positions or engaged in such functions). This
is found in the regulations’ definition of “covered employee”, which
refers to employees “subject to the Hours of Service Act”48. The Hours
of Service Act, as it read at the time the regulations were adopted,
defined such employees as individuals “engaged in or connected
with the movement of any train, including hostlers”49. Thus, “safety-
sensitive” as it was first used cast a very wide net indeed.
After the FRA passed the Railroad Regulations, other Depart-
ment of Transport agencies followed, including the Federal Aviation
Administration, the Federal Highway Administration, the Coast
Guard, and the Urban Mass Transportation Administration. These
regulations all include the notion of “safety-sensitive position” and
they all provide for mandatory pre-employment testing, testing on a
periodic basis, on reasonable suspicion, after a serious accident, and
randomly50.
4. Executive Order 12564
Soon after the Commission on Organized Crime tabled its report
in March of 1986, Ronald and Nancy51 Reagan addressed the nation
on live television to announce a “national crusade against drug
abuse”52. In the address, the President reiterated the relationship
48 49 C.F.R. § 219.5(d) (referenced in the Railroad Regulations, 31569).
49 45 U.S.C. § 61 (3)(2). A “hostler” is someone who moves locomotives while in a
yard but not on the main line.
50 John G. TYSSE & Garen E. DODGE, Winning the War on Drugs: The Role of Work-
place Testing, Washington, National Foundation for the Study of Employment
Policy, 1989.
51 On Nancy Reagan’s role on the drug war, see J. GILLIOM, supra, note 6, p. 29-30
(arguing that Nancy Reagan was advised by White House staff to adopt “the
drug problem” as an issue in order to bolster her waning popularity, resulting in
the “Just say no” campaign).
52 “Address to the Nation on the Campaign Against Drug Abuse, September 14,
1986”, The Public Papers of President Ronald W. Reagan, Ronald Reagan Presi-
dential Library, at <http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1986/
091486a.htm> (accessed Nov. 21, 2007).
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between traditional values and drug use, stating that “[d]rugs are
menacing our society. They’re threatening our values and under-
cutting our institutions. They’re killing our children.” Evoking the U.S.
as the land of freedom constructed and a safe haven for those who
escaped starvation, disease, the holocaust, and the Soviet gulags,
Reagan said: “What an insult it will be to what we are and whence
we came if we do not rise up together in defiance against this cancer
of drugs.”
This television address was the first occasion on which Reagan
made reference to a relationship between drug use and accidents,
saying that “everyone’s safety is at stake when drugs and excessive
alcohol are used by people on the highways or by those transporting
our citizens or operating industrial equipment”53. The next day,
Reagan signed Executive Order 12564 – Drug-Free Federal Work-
place54, thereby subjecting over a million federal employees to ran-
dom urinalysis drug testing55.
The theme of drugs being responsible for social breakdown can
be seen in the preamble of Executive Order 12564, where it is stated
that “[t]he profits from illegal drugs provide the single greatest source
of income for organized crime, fuel violent street crime, and other-
wise contribute to the breakdown of our society”. However, the rela-
tionship to workplace safety also makes an appearance, with the
statement that “[t]he use of illegal drugs, on or off duty, by Federal
employees… can pose a serious health and safety threat to mem-
bers of the public and to other Federal employees”. The remainder
of the Order is premised on the position that “[p]ersons who use ille-
gal drugs are not suitable for Federal employment”56. It mandates
53 This was to become an increasingly explicit theme. See e.g. “Remarks at a Sem-
inar on Substance Abuse in the Workplace in Durham, North Carolina, Febru-
ary 8, 1988”, The Public Papers of President Ronald W. Reagan, Ronald Reagan
Presidential Library, <http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1988/
020888b.htm> (accessed Nov. 22, 2007), and “Remarks at the National Confer-
ence on Corporate Initiatives for a Drug Free Workplace, June 9, 1988”, <http://
www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1988/020888b.htm> (accessed Nov.
22, 2007).
54 51 F.R. 32889, 3 C.F.R., 1986 Comp., p. 224.
55 The figure cited in from J. GILLIOM, supra, note 6, p. 30 is 1.2 million. In R.M.
TOBIAS, “You’re in Government? Urine Trouble”, in B.N.A., (ed.), Employee Test-
ing, Washington, Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., 1988, IV-93, the figure cited is
1.1 million.
56 Executive Order 12564, supra, note 54, s. 1 (c).
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the head of each executive agency to develop a programme to erad-
icate drugs from the workplace, including through the use of drug
testing57.
In addition to authorizing mandatory screening for all appli-
cants to the Federal civil service58, the order authorizes mandatory
testing where: (1) there is a reasonable suspicion that an employee
uses illegal drugs, (2) it is conducted in the course of an investiga-
tion into an “accident or unsafe practice”, and (3) it is part of a coun-
selling or rehabilitation programme related to employment (i.e. an
Employee Assistance Programme)59.
Whereas in the above cases the agency head is authorized to
implement testing, there is one section of the Order that requires a
testing programme. Section 3(a) of the Order states:
“(a) The head of each Executive agency shall establish a program to
test for the use of illegal drugs by employees in sensitive posi-
tions…”
After the appearance of “critical positions” in the Report of the
President’s Commission on Organized Crime, we now see “sensitive
positions” in the Executive Order that implements the Commission’s
recommendations. There appears, however, only to be a loose con-
nection to the notion of “safety-sensitive position” adopted by the
Federal Railroad Administration. The definition of “sensitive posi-
tions” is found in Section 7 (d) of the Order, which states:
“(d) For purposes of this Order, the term ‘employee in a sensitive
position’ refers to: 
(1) An employee in a position that an agency head designates
Special Sensitive, Critical-Sensitive, or Noncritical-Sensitive
under Chapter 731 of the Federal Personnel Manual or an
employee in a position that an agency head designates as sen-
sitive in accordance with Executive Order 10450, as amended; 
(2) An employee who has been granted access to classified infor-
mation or may be granted access to classified information pur-
suant to a determination of trustworthiness by an agency head
under Section 4 of Executive Order 12356; 
57 Id., s. 2.
58 Id., s. 3 (d).
59 Id., s. 3 (c).
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(3) Individuals serving under Presidential appointments; 
(4) Law enforcement officers as defined in 5 U.S.C. 8331(20);
and
(5) Other positions that the agency head determines involve law
enforcement, national security, the protection of life and prop-
erty, public health or safety, or other functions requiring a high
degree of trust and confidence.” 
The notion of “sensitive” deployed here is broad; vast even. Posi-
tions are sensitive if they have the potential for “inestimable”,
“exceptionally grave”, “serious”, or “moderate” adverse impact on
the efficiency of the agency or service60. Positions are sensitive if
their occupants could bring about “… a material adverse effect on
the national security”61. Positions held under Presidential appoint-
ment, in law enforcement or that require access to classified docu-
ments are also sensitive. Note that s. 7(d)(5) appears to be a catch-all
category that covers positions that might have been missed by the
previous four subsections. The order does reference safety, though
it is not in terms of workplace safety, but rather public safety.
The adoption of workplace safety as a primary justification for
generalized drug testing is clear in the administrative guidelines that
implemented Executive Order 12564. 
5. Federal Personnel Manual Letter 792-16
A little over two months after President Reagan signed, the U.S.
Office of Personnel Management circulated Federal Personnel Manual
60 These are the definitions of “Special-Sensitive”, “Critical-Sensitive”, and “Non-
Critical Sensitive” that appear in Chapter 731 of the Federal Personnel Manual,
referred to in 7(d)(1). See U.S CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION & U.S. OFFICE OF PERSON-
NEL MANAGEMENT, Federal Personnel Manual, Washington, Office of Personnel
Management, Supt. of Docs., U.S. G.P.O., 1956, p. 731-7 and 731-8.
61 This is the definition of “sensitive position” found at s. 4 (b) of Executive Order
10450 of Apr. 27, 1953, 18 F.R. 2489, 3 C.F.R.,1949-1953 Comp., p. 936, which
is referred to in 7(d)(1). Drug use was already prohibited for occupants of these
positions, along with “...criminal, infamous, dishonest, immoral, or notoriously
disgraceful conduct, …[or] sexual perversion” (at s. 8(a)(1)(iii) of Executive Order
10450). For the implementation guidelines of Executive Order 10450, see Chap-
ter 732 of the U.S CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION & U.S. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGE-
MENT, supra, note 60.
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Letter 792-16, as directed by the President62. Such letters are sup-
plements to be added to the loose leaf Federal Personnel Manual
(“FPM”), which is a series of guidelines that are in the nature of
employer policies, rather than the result of a delegated power of reg-
ulation63. The Office of Personnel Management describes such let-
ters as follows:
“FPM Letters generally are advisory guidance for supervisors and
personnel specialists to use as management tools and ordinarily
would not be published under formal rulemaking procedures.”64
In the introduction to FPM Letter 792-16, which – it should be
noted – purports to interpret and implement, but not add to, Exec-
utive Order 12564, the justification for drug testing contains the
following passage:
“Employees who use illegal drugs have three to four times more
accidents while at work. Federal workers have the right to a safe
and secure workplace, and all American citizens, who daily depend
on the work of the Federal government for their health, safety and
security, have the right to a reliable and productive civil service.
Federal agencies must take action for the protection of individual
drug users, their co-workers, and the society at large. In recogni-
tion of this, President Reagan, in Executive Order 12564, set forth
62 Executive Order 12564, supra, note 54, stipulates, at s. 6(a)(1), that the Office of
Personnel Management (the successor agency to the U.S. Civil Service Commis-
sion) shall “[i]ssue government-wide guidance to agencies on the implementa-
tion of the terms of this Order”. 
63 This was not lost on unions who contested FPM Letter 792-16 on the grounds
that it did not meet the notice and comment requirements of the Federal Admin-
istrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553. In National Treasury Employees Union v.
Reagan, 685 F. Supp. 1346, at 1355, the U.S. District Court found that “FPM
Letter 792-16… guides agencies on implementation of the Executive Order and
is a binding legislative rule. The Federal Personnel Manual Letter was not issued
in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act and is invalid.” When the
union sought to have the implementation of FPM Letter 792-16 halted until the
notice and comment requirements had been met, the Court refused, citing that
“...due to the strong interests promoted by drug testing of sensitive public
employees… it would be unnecessarily disruptive to enjoin implementation of
the plans while the agencies comply with the APA procedures.” Instead, the
Court simply ordered the Office of Personnel Management to notify the plaintiff
union and accept its comments. (1988) WL 106328: WestLaw, 1.
64 Federal Personnel Manual Letter 792-19, (1989) 54 F.R. 47324-01.
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the policy of the United States Government to eliminate drug use
from the Federal workplace.”65
Here we can clearly see how the initial stated reasons for the
implementation of mass drug testing in the Federal civil service gave
way to a different justification. 
B. From Moral Crusade to “Safety-Sensitive Positions”
In the initial programme in the military, the report of the Com-
mission on Organized Crime, and Reagan’s public statements on
the drug war, values were an organizing principle. Drugs were an
“epidemic” or “societal malady” that ravaged “families” by “eroding
traditional values” and sustaining organized crime. Drug testing was
proposed as one way to combat the “drug problem” as a component
of a general demand reduction strategy implemented in a particu-
larly effective site of regulation – the workplace. In so far as safety
was an issue, it was primarily limited to the transportation sector.
Executive Order 12564 symbolically marks the shift from a rel-
atively localized phenomenon concerned primarily with public safety
in particular sectors, to a massively generalized norm applicable to
vast swaths of the population66. On the other hand, the context of
its adoption and later interpretation demonstrate the complex inter-
play between the rhetoric of morality and values, mobilized as a reason
for introducing testing and safety, which justifies it67. In the order,
65 Federal Personnel Manual Letter 792-16, at s. 1 (b) (reprinted in Appendix 4 of
Craig M. CORNISH, Drugs and Alcohol in the Workplace: Testing and Privacy, Wil-
mette, Ill., Callaghan, 1988, p. 272). The figure of “three to four times more acci-
dents while at work” has been traced to a “study” allegedly done at Firestone
Tire and Rubber Company in 1973. Researchers have conclusively demon-
strated that this “study” was in fact never done, and that the figure was simply
made up. For the story behind this fictional data and its use by the U.S. gov-
ernment, see John P. MORGAN, “The ‘Scientific’ Justification for Urine Drug Test-
ing”, (1988) 36 U. Kan. L. Rev. 683, 683-685; AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION,
Drug Testing: A Bad Investment, New York, ACLU Department of Public Educa-
tion, 1999. See also J. GILLIOM, supra, note 6, p. 40-43.
66 Note that on the same day Reagan signed Executive Order 12564 he transmit-
ted to Congress a draft bill, the Drug-Free America Act. It would evolve into the
Drug Free Workplace Act, 41 U.S.C. 701 (1988), which requires those contract-
ing with the Federal government to adopt a series of anti-drug measures tar-
geting their employees.
67 On drug testing as an exercise in symbolism, see Steven WISOTSKY, “The Ideology
of Drug Testing”, (1987) 11 Nova Law Review 763.
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the theme of morality coexists with a certain number of references
to safety, though generally in the context of public safety rather than
occupational safety. With FPM Letter 792-16, safety (along with pro-
ductivity) becomes a central justification for drug testing.
I do not mean to say that safety was simply an afterthought cyn-
ically mobilized for propaganda purposes. Clearly, the relationship
between drug use and safety was a primary concern in the formu-
lation of the Railroad Regulations. What I do want to claim is that
the discourse of values was a condition of possibility68 for a discourse
of safety. 
During the early period of the “drug war”, there was a significant
and sustained production of knowledge around drugs that was
organized around the concept of the harm that drugs cause. Starting
from the principle that drugs are both a cause of and a consequence
of a general corruption of society, researchers sought to discover,
catalogue and organize understanding of the particular harms that
drugs cause69. Workplace accidents were one of the harms that
68 Other conditions include the technology to test (for without testing, the produc-
tion of knowledge about use is severely limited), which was predicated on the
existence of a drug testing industry with economic incentives to develop not only
the “solution” of drug testing, but the “problem” of drugs in the workplace. On
these factors, see Lynn ZIMMER & James B. JACOBS, “The Business of Drug Test-
ing: Technological Innovation and Social Control”, (1992) 19 Contemporary Drug
Problems 1; Kenneth D. TUNNELL, Pissing on Demand: Workplace Drug Testing
and the Rise of the Detox Industry, New York, NYU Press, 2004. This nexus between
technology, knowledge, economic incentives and institutional goals offers the
possibility of theorizing drug testing in terms of what Michel Foucault called a
dispositif (“dispositive”). On dispositive analysis, see Lawrence OLIVIER, “La ques-
tion du pouvoir chez Foucault: espace, stratégie et dispositif”, (1988) 21(1) Cana-
dian Journal of Political Science / Revue canadienne de science politique 83, esp.
92-93; see also Giorgio AGAMBEN, Qu’est-ce qu’un dispositif?, Paris, Rivages,
2007. 
69 A parallel can be seen with the temperance movement of the late 19th and early
20th centuries. The conception of alcohol as a moral disorder (both of individu-
als and of society generally) led to a significant production of knowledge around
the mechanisms by which it caused harm. For examples of this research, see
e.g. William HARGREAVES, Alcohol and Science, or, Alcohol: What it is and What it
Does, New York, National Temperance Society and Publication House, 1882; Alonzo
Benjamin PALMER & Mary A.R. LIVERMORE, The Temperance Teachings of Science:
Adapted to the use of teachers and pupils in the public schools, Boston, D. C. Heath,
1886. For a discussion on the similarities between the Canadian temperance
movement and the drug war in the 1980s, see Anton R.F. SCHWEIGHOFER, “The
Canadian Temperance Movement: Contemporary Parallels”, (1988) 3 CJLS/RCDS
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became a possible object of study once the moral discourse had posed
these parameters. 
The strength and pervasiveness of the category of “harm” is
attested to by the fact that it organized debate around drug policy
across the spectrum. Those who argued against prohibition as a
method of regulating “the drug problem” called for its redefinition in
terms of “a public health” issue rather than a moral one. The common
appellation of this position is a “harm reduction strategy”70.
This production of knowledge about drug harms was (and
remains) an explicit policy of the U.S. government. It was largely
accomplished through the National Institute on Drug Abuse (“NIDA”),
which was established in 1972 as a branch of the U.S. Health Depart-
ment71. Workplace drug use became a subject of interest for the
NIDA in the 1980s:
“…[NIDA] played an important role in shaping employers’ beliefs
regarding both these issues [that employee drug use was a prob-
lem and that drug testing offered a solution]. Throughout the
1980s NIDA provided funding to researchers studying the work-
place drug problem, and by 1990 it had sponsored four national
conferences on the topic. Even before President Reagan ordered
the testing of federal workers, NIDA had funded the development of
new drug-testing technologies and had urged public and private
employers to adopt testing programs.”72
Former NIDA scientists have said that it was made clear to fund-
ing applicants that only research into harms, and not benefits, of
drugs would receive grants73.
This research programme produced a certain number of “truths”
about the relationship between drug use and safety. It also allowed
70 See e.g. the anti-prohibition U.S. Drug Policy Alliance, at <http://www.drug-
policy.org>.
71 Helen PEARSON, “Science and the war on drugs: A hard habit to break”, (2004)
430 Nature 394, 394.
72 L. ZIMMER & J.B. JACOBS, supra, note 68, 16 (references omitted).
73 H. PEARSON, supra, note 71, 395. This comment was regarding drug research
generally, and not the question of drugs in the workplace per se.
175. On the role of social research in policy formation in Canada, see Patricia G.
ERICKSON, “Neglected and Rejected: A Case Study of the Impact of Social Research
on Canadian Drug Policy”, (1998) 23(2-3) Can. J. Soc. 263.
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safety to become a central justification for drug testing. If drug use
causes accidents, then eliminating drug users from positions in
which accidents can have catastrophic consequences appears jus-
tified. This is the central position that came to structure the dispa-
rate notions of “critical positions”, “sensitive positions” and “safety-
sensitive positions”.
That drug testing is a method to promote safety – in particular
by reducing the risk of accidents that cause harm to the public or to
workers – became the gold standard of justifications. Defence of drug
testing on these grounds was invariably accompanied by claims
that “scientific” studies demonstrate a causal relationship between
drug testing and reduced accident rates. The following passage from
Winning the War on Drugs: The Role of Workplace Testing is typical:
“[T]he overwhelming evidence establishes that workplace drug
testing, as part of an anti-drug abuse program, does in fact deter
illegal drug use both on and off the job. Drug testing has been
shown to be effective in preventing the negative consequences of
workplace drug abuse, including those situations where drug-
induced impairment threatens the life of the employee, fellow
workers, or the public at large.”74
In fact, there was very little peer-reviewed research clearly relat-
ing drug testing to accidents. What little research there was in the
early 1980s was either so methodologically unsound as to be totally
useless, or inconclusive75. But the scientific validity of claims relat-
ing drug testing to accidents was to become a somewhat moot point.
For the reasoning that drug use causes accidents and that there-
74 G.J. TYSSE & G.E. DODGE, supra, note 50, p. 14.
75 See references at note 65, supra. More recent research has found a very weak
correlation or none at all. See, e.g. Jacques NORMAND, Stephen SALYARDS & John
MAHONEY, “An Evaluation of Preemployment Testing”, (1990) 75(6) Journal of
Applied Psychology 629, 635 (finding that “no statistically significant relation-
ship was detected between drug-test results and number of injuries”); Rebecca
S. SPICER, Ted R. MILLER, & Gordon S. SMITH, “Worker Substance Use, Workplace
Problems and the Risk of Occupational Injury: A Matched Case-Control Study”,
(2003) 64 Journal of Studies on Alcohol 570, 575 (finding that there appeared to
be a correlation but that “[b]oth substance users and risk-takers were more
likely to be injured. However only risk taking was a significant predictor of injury
when substance use was controlled for.”). See also Cheryl J. CHERPITEL, “Sub-
stance Use, Injury, and Risk-Taking Disposition in the General Population”, (1999)
23-1 Alcoholism: Clinical and Experimental Research 121 (finding that risk-taking
and impulsivity are better indicators of injury than substance use).
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fore drug tests will prevent them became legally true when the U.S.
Supreme Court cited safety as the principle justification for allow-
ing mass drug testing in employment.
The safety justification was finally endorsed by the U.S. Supreme
Court in Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Association76. It was
in this case that the Court upheld the Federal Railroad Administra-
tion regulations requiring testing of those in safety-sensitive posi-
tions. The Court found that urine tests constitute searches within
the meaning of the 4th Amendment of the Constitution77. Relying
upon the “special needs doctrine”, which allows searches without a
warrant even in the absence of individualized suspicion, the Court
proceeded to balance the government interest in testing against the
privacy interest of employees. Justice Kennedy, for the majority,
concluded that:
“The Government interest in testing without a showing of individ-
ualized suspicion is compelling. Employees subject to the tests
discharge duties fraught with such risks of injury to others that
even a momentary lapse of attention can have disastrous conse-
quences.”78
Shortly thereafter, the Court rendered its decision in National
Treasury Employees Union et al. v. Von Raab79, in which it confirmed
the constitutionality of mandatory testing for customs agents. The
Court found that the tests were justified because the “Customs
Service is our Nation’s first line of defense against one of the great-
est problems affecting the health and welfare of our population”80,
and because customs agents carry firearms, which raise significant
safety concerns81.
It was this reasoning, linking drug testing to safety, that guided
the adoption of drug testing programmes in Canada subsequent to
the U.S. experience. As we shall see in the following section, the
Canadian model is in fact a direct descendent of the legal framework
governing drug testing in the U.S.
76 489 U.S. 602 (1989) [hereinafter “Skinner”].
77 Id., 617.
78 Id., 628.
79 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
80 Id., 668.
81 Id., 670, 672.
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III. The Canadian model
The designation of the generally accepted legal principles govern-
ing drug testing in Canada as the Canadian model is recent. This
“model” is portrayed as the natural consequence of jurisprudential
accumulation resulting in the crystallization of a stable set of rules
according to an inherent logic. In this section, I will argue that this
origin story is misleading, if not outright false. Instead, I claim that
the Canadian jurisprudence is, and was from the very beginning, a
derivative of the U.S. model. The model migrated northwards through
multiple mechanisms at multiple moments, each of which consti-
tutes a “point of infection” at which the U.S. model was transmitted.
The spread of the “drug testing virus” also occurred laterally through
the Canadian jurisprudence, allowing its origins to be covered over.
The existence of the Canadian model, and its characterization,
was recently described in a lengthy arbitration decision by arbitra-
tor M. G. Picher. Picher describes the “development” of the model as
follows:
“[98] It is fair to say that over time the arbitral jurisprudence in
Canada has developed relatively clear lines as to what constitutes
an acceptable drug and alcohol testing policy in a safety sensitive
workplace which is governed by a collective bargaining regime… 
[99] The… jurisprudence has come to be viewed as tantamount to
a Canadian code for drug testing in a safety sensitive workplace
governed by collective bargaining, the regime by which terms and
conditions of employment must be negotiated between employers
and unions. They have become widely accepted and applied. Indeed,
the drug testing policies and limitations fashioned within that
jurisprudence came to be recognized as the Canadian model as
adopted in the construction industry in Alberta.
[100] At the risk of oversimplification, the Canadian model for alco-
hol or drug testing in a safety sensitive workplace as developed in
the arbitral jurisprudence generally contains a number of elements
as summarized below:
• No employee can be subjected to random, unannounced alcohol
or drug testing, save as part of an agreed rehabilitative program.
• An employer may require alcohol or drug testing of an individual
where the facts give the employer reasonable cause to do so.
• It is within the prerogatives of management’s rights under a col-
lective agreement to also require alcohol or drug testing following
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a significant incident, accident or near miss, where it may be
important to identify the root cause of what occurred.
• Drug and alcohol testing is a legitimate part of continuing con-
tracts of employment for individuals found to have a problem of
alcohol or drug use… This is the only exceptional circumstance
in which the otherwise protected employee interest in privacy
and dignity of the person must yield to the interests of safety
and rehabilitation, to allow for random and unannounced alco-
hol or drug testing.
• The cases generally recognize that an employee’s refusal or
failure to undergo an alcohol or drug test in the three circums-
tances described above may properly be viewed as a serious vio-
lation of the employer’s drug and alcohol policy, and may itself
be grounds for serious discipline.”82
Though this description of the model is accurate, it obscures its
provenance by characterizing it as a simple jurisprudential evolu-
tion. In fact, the model can be traced to the U.S., and it is not so
much a development of Canadian law as it is a set of norms that
migrated north and was subsequently ratified by the jurisprudence.
I have identified two primary “points of infection”. First, the various
transportation guidelines adopted by the U.S. Department of Trans-
portation began to filter through to the Canadian transportation
industry, from whence they spread to other industries. Second, U.S.-
based companies with Canadian operations applied their drug test-
ing policies to their Canadian employees.
A. Migration From the United States: The Virus Spreads
Drug testing was well underway in the U.S. before it became a
major issue in Canada. Despite Prime Minister Mulroney’s announce-
ment – the day after Reagan signed Executive Order 12564 – that
Canada was afflicted with a “drug epidemic”83, employment drug
testing was not the immediate response. “On the whole, the Canadian
82 Imperial Oil, supra, note 3, references omitted.
83 Eric L. JENSEN & Jurg GERBER, “State Efforts to Construct a Social Problem: The
1986 War on Drugs in Canada”, (1993) 18(4) Canadian Journal of Sociology 453,
454. See also Lennard E. HENRIKSSON, “The Unconvincing Case for Drug Testing”,
(1991) XVII(2) Canadian Public Policy – Analyse de Politiques 183, 185 [herein-
after “Unconvincing Case for Drug Testing”]. Henriksson reports that Mulroney
later claimed the timing was purely coincidental.
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business community and professional groups were reluctant to fol-
low the American lead on the testing issue.”84 One notable excep-
tion was the transportation industry, to which we now turn. 
1. Norms on Rails: Drug Testing and the Canadian 
Railroad Industry
A national consultation on substance abuse in the workplace
held by Health Canada in 1988 found that the transportation indus-
try believed testing to be an important tool in reducing accidents.
The report describes their position as follows:
“[R]epresentatives from the transport industry… expressed an
urgent need for more measures to control alcohol and drug use in
their own activities because of public safety… They believed their
personal experience, specially collected data, and U.S. studies
demonstrated that the potential adverse impacts were serious
enough to require more immediate action than normal programs
[i.e. those without a testing component] could deliver.”85
The report goes on to state that rail employers believed there to
be a link between substance abuse and accidents, particularly with
regard to “safety-sensitive positions”, and that consequently they
had already begun testing86.
Not only had testing already begun in the railway industry, but
the testing in the railway industry led to the very first arbitration
cases dealing with drug testing in Canada. Four months prior to the
consultation held by Health Canada87, the Canadian Railway Office
84 Unconvincing Case for Drug Testing, supra, note 83, 184. See also GOVERNMENT
OF CANADA, National Drug Strategy: Action on Drug Abuse, Ottawa, Queen’s Printer,
1987 (drug-testing not part of the national drug strategy) and B. HALLIDAY, Booze,
Pills & Dope: Reducing Substance Abuse in Canada: Report of the Standing Com-
mittee on National Health and Welfare on Alcohol and Drug Abuse, Ottawa,
Queen’s Printer, 1987 (conceding that reasonable cause testing may be desira-
ble in some circumstances, but that random testing was to be proscribed).
85 CANADA (MINISTER OF NATIONAL HEALTH AND WELFARE) & NIAGARA INSTITUTE, Report of
the National Consultation on Substance Abuse and the Workplace, Ottawa, Min-
istry of Supply and Services Canada [cat. H21-101/1988], 1988, p. 21 [herein-
after “National Consultation”].
86 Id. 
87 The consultations were held on February 14-16 and 21-23, 1988, National Con-
sultation, supra, note 85, p. 51-52.
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of Arbitration & Dispute Resolution (the “CROA”88) rendered the first
two decisions in Canada on drug testing89. 
In the Hutchinson case, the grievor was a train conductor who
had been charged with the cultivation of a substantial quantity of
marijuana – a charge that was subsequently stayed for reasons
unrelated to the strength of the Crown’s case. His employer, Cana-
dian Pacific, ordered him to submit to urinalysis screening, which
he refused. Though there was no evidence that he had ever been
impaired at work, the company terminated his employment on the
grounds that participation in “the drug culture” was incompatible
with his employment. With regard to the relationship between off-
duty drug use and employment, Arbitrator Picher stated:
“This case raises, in vivid terms, the issue of the obligations of a
railroad in respect of the involvement of its employees in the pro-
duction, trafficking, possession or use of illegal drugs. There was a
time, in the 1960’s, when a substantial body of opinion held that
“soft” drugs, and marijuana in particular, were relatively benign
substances whose use posed no substantial threat. Those days are
gone. Two decades of experience with accidents, both industrial
and non-industrial, sometimes tragic in their proportions, caused by
the use of prohibited drugs, have gradually affirmed the conclusion
that involvement with illegal drugs, including marijuana, poses a
dangerous threat to health and safety.”90
Though Mr. Hutchinson’s refusal to submit to a drug test was
not invoked as a reason for termination per se, Arbitrator Picher
discussed the issue in his award. He reviewed the state of the law in
the United States, with particular reference to the Railroad Regula-
tions, noting that “[t]he American regulation seeks, insofar as pos-
sible, to balance the interest of the railway to ensure safe operations
with the interest of the employee not to be unduly deprived of rights
88 The CROA is a consensual arbitration tribunal established by memorandum of
agreement in 1965, under the Canada Labour Code. Both major railways in
Canada, the Canadian National Railroad (CN) and the Canada Pacific Railroad
(CP), and their various unions are parties to the memorandum. See the CROA
web site at <http://www.croa.com>.
89 Canadian Pacific Ltd. v. U.T.U. (Hutchinson grievance), (1987) 31 L.A.C. (3d) 179;
[1988] C.L.A.D. No. 61, CROA Case No. 1703 (M.G. Picher) [hereinafter “Hutch-
inson” cited to CROA] and Canadian Pacific Ltd. v. U.T.U. (Keal grievance), (1987)
7 C.L.A.S. 44, CROA Case No. 1704 (M.G. Picher) [hereinafter “Keal” cited to
CROA].
90 Hutchinson, supra, note 89, p. 2-3, emphasis added.
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of personal dignity and privacy”91. He recognized that there are no
comparable regulations in Canada nor any reported decision on the
issue of drug testing. He then went on to state:
“Where, as in the instant case, the employer is a public carrier, and
the employee’s duties are inherently safety sensitive, any reason-
able grounds to believe that an employee may be impaired by drugs
while on duty or subject to duty must be seen as justifying a require-
ment that the employee undergo a drug test. Given contemporary
realities and the imperative of safety, that condition must be seen
as implicit in the contract of employment, absent any express pro-
vision to the contrary.
[...]
What guidance do the foregoing considerations provide in the
instant case? It appears to the Arbitrator that a number of useful
principles emerge. The first is that as an employer charged with the
safe operation of a railroad, the Company has a particular obliga-
tion to ensure that those employees responsible for the movement
of trains perform their duties unimpaired by the effects of drugs.
To that end the Company must exert vigilance and may, where rea-
sonable justification is demonstrated, require an employee to sub-
mit to a drug test… The refusal by an employee to submit to such
a test, in circumstances where the employer has reasonable and
probable grounds to suspect drug use and a risk of impairment,
may leave the employee liable to removal from service. It is simply
incompatible with the obligations of a public carrier to its custom-
ers, employees and the public at large, to place any responsibility
for the movement of trains in the hands of an employee whom it
has reasonable grounds to suspect is either drug-dependent or drug-
impaired… On the other hand, it is not within the legitimate busi-
ness purposes of an employer, including a railroad, to encroach on
the privacy and dignity of its employees by subjecting them to ran-
dom and speculative drug testing…”92
Three important features of this passage bear discussing. First,
safety is unequivocally the justification for drug testing. The notion
of safety-sensitive positions is mobilized (for the first time in Cana-
91 Id., p. 4.
92 Hutchinson, supra, note 89, p. 4-5. I have heavily edited the quoted section for
length, which inevitably excises some of the nuance. However, I am confident that
readers who consult the full text of the award will agree that I have not denatured
its meaning.
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dian jurisprudence)93 and appears to have the same scope as in the
U.S. Railroad Regulations, that is “employees who are responsible
for the movement of trains”. Second, the extent of permissible test-
ing and the consequences for the employee mirror with almost per-
fect precision the U.S. Railroad Regulations in force at the time of
the award (recall that the award was rendered in 1987 and the U.S.
Railroad Regulations were not amended to allow for random testing
until 1988)94. Finally, this passage contains the basic framework of
the Canadian model as it was articulated almost twenty years later;
a model that was described as having evolved over time.
The same arbitrator rendered the Keal decision on the same day
as the Hutchinson decision. The award is significantly shorter and
simply relies on Hutchinson for its authority. Arbitrator Picher found
that Mr. Keal occupied a safety-sensitive position and that his arrest
for marijuana possession two hours prior to the beginning of his
shift, coupled with his refusal to submit to a drug test, justified his
dismissal by Canadian Pacific95.
The Hutchinson and Keal decisions demonstrate how the viral
metaphor accounts for the migration of drug testing norms. Arbitra-
tor Picher explicitly recognizes that no Canadian legislature decided
to import the American norms. Yet they were transmitted to Canada.
First, by the railways themselves, who implemented testing after rely-
ing on U.S. data to conclude that testing was necessary. Second, the
U.S. Regulations and jurisprudence provided the framework within
which Arbitrator Picher could conclude that drug testing was legit-
imate. Third, the immediate reliance on Hutchinson in Keal without
reference to the American norms demonstrates that once a “host”
legal system is infected, the virus can replicate and spread laterally
across the jurisprudence. 
This lateral spread continued. In the late 1980s and early 1990s,
the Hutchinson decision was routinely cited as the setting out the
principles governing drug testing in Canada, though often without
93 But see Re Canadian Pacific Ltd. v. Rail Canada Traffic Controllers (Sidoni griev-
ance), (1981) CROA Case No. 946 (Weatherill), p. 2, where it was found that a
diagnosed alcoholic could not return to work after absence for treatment unless
he was first certified as fit for duty by a doctor, since the duties of a rail traffic
controller “…impinge so directly upon the safety of operations.”
94 See text accompanying note 46, supra.
95 Keal, supra, note 89, p. 2.
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reference to its U.S. origins96. As these principles spread beyond the
railroad industry, so did the notion of “safety-sensitive positions”.
From the initial justification of the risk of catastrophic train wrecks,
any job with the possibility of injury began to be characterized as
safety-sensitive. For instance, in the City of Winnipeg case the city
sought to impose random testing on a garbage collector who had been
found smoking marijuana on the job. The safety concerns related to
garbage collection are described as follows:
“The grievor works in assisting the loading of a collection vehicle…
The helpers pick up refuse and load it into a rear collector, which
has a compactor in the back of the hopper of the vehicle. A refuse
helper must be certain that he and others are clear of this mech-
anism when the machine is being operated. Occasionally, mem-
bers of the public may be around when refuse is being thrown into
the truck and must be kept away. Employees have been injured
because of not being clear of the vehicle and injuries can be seri-
ous, such as a loss of a hand. The grievor is also required to guide
the driver of the truck when backing up.”97
Citing Hutchinson, the arbitrator concluded that there was “a
legitimate concern over safety”98 and that the city was justified in
imposing the drug tests.
This indirect effect of the U.S. Department of Transport regula-
tions was coupled with a direct effect. In several decisions, arbitrators
were faced with the fact that workers in the transportation industry
engaged in cross-border traffic were apparently subject to the U.S.
regulations99. Thus, the question arose as to whether a violation of
U.S. regulations was just cause for discipline by a Canadian employer.
96 See, e.g. Re Canadian National Railway Co. and U.T.U., (1989) 6 L.A.C. (4th)
381; 14 C.L.A.S. 74 (CROA, M.G. Picher); Re Quintette Coal Ltd. and U.S.W.A.,
Local 9113 (Regensberger grievance), (1989) 14 C.L.A.S. 2 (A. Hope); Re Inco
Ltd., Manitoba Division and U.S.W.A., Local 6166, [1989] C.L.A.S.J. 557689
(Carr); Re Provincial-American Truck Transporters and Teamsters, Local 880,
(1991) 18 L.A.C. (4th) 412 (Brent) [hereinafter Provincial-American Transport];
Re Winnipeg (City) and C.U.P.E., Loc. 500, (1991) 23 L.A.C. (4th) 441 (Baizley)
[hereinafter, City of Winnipeg]; Re Cominco Ltd. and U.S.W.A., Local 480, [1993]
C.L.A.S.J. 584223 (Williams).
97 City of Winnipeg, supra, note 96, 443.
98 Id., 446.
99 This was technically not the case. The U.S. government gave diplomatic assur-
ances that no Canadian-based transport employees would be subject to the reg-
ulations, pending the adoption of Canadian regulations. The Canadian government
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Again, this trend started with a CROA decision rendered by Arbi-
trator Picher in the railway industry. In that decision100, the grievor,
Mr. Bernier, was required by U.S. officials to undergo urinalysis
after he injured his hand replacing a light on a train. The test was
positive for marijuana metabolites and the company dismissed Mr.
Bernier for “conduct incompatible with his duties”. Arbitrator Picher
found that the Railroad Regulations could not be blindly applied to
Canadian employees:
“It should be noted that there is no federal regulation in Canada
regarding the detection of drugs in the railway industry. Further-
more, to date the Company has issued no internal regulation on
this subject. The presumption of impairment, invoked in the Amer-
ican regulation by a positive urine test, has no basis in logic or in
science. It is admitted that this test demonstrates only the use of a
drug during the sixty days prior to the taking of the sample. It pro-
vides no precise information concerning when, where or in what
quantity the drug was taken. Therefore, the presumption of impair-
ment is a legal construction decreed for the particular purposes of
the American regulation. This same regulation also allows the
employee to take advantage of a blood test to refute the presumption
that he, or she, was working while under the influence of drugs. In
sum, this is a question of a very specialized and extraordinary reg-
ulation in the field of working conditions.
There is nothing similar in the Company’s regulations in Canada
for the purposes of discipline in general. In the Arbitrator’s view, in
the absence of a regulation which explains clearly to employees who
violate the American regulation that not only could they be forbidden
to work in the United States but could also be discharged from the
100 Re Canadian National Railway and U.T.U. (Bernier), (1990) 11 L.A.C. (4th) 364,
CROA Case No. 2025 (M.G. Picher) [hereinafter Bernier, cited to CROA).
responded by tabling draft legislation, which was referred to the Standing Com-
mittee on Transport. Transport Canada adopted virtually all of the Committee’s
recommendations, and draft regulations were adopted by Cabinet. The proposed
legislation and ratification of the draft regulations died on the order table after
the defeat of the Conservative government in 1993. See generally Mel F. BELICH
& Michael J. SCHEWCHUK, “Drug Testing in the Transportation Sector: An Employer
Perspective”, (1994) 2(3) Can. Lab. L.J. 516. See also, Unconvincing Case for
Drug Testing, supra, note 83, 185. On Transport Canada’s response to the Stand-
ing Committee’s recommendations, see Transport Canada, Substance Use in
Safety-Sensitive Positions in Canadian Transportation: Government Response to
the Third Report of the Standing Committee on Transport, Ottawa, November 7,
1990 [Document No. TP 10694].
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Company in Canada, it is difficult to justify the dismissal of an
employee for this reason alone.”101
Mr. Bernier was re-instated, but under the condition that he
“agree” to undergo period unannounced urine or blood testing. He
was also forbidden from working in the U.S. “unless the American
authorities permit it and unless the company, at its sole discretion,
allows him to do so”102.
Whereas the Hutchinson case notes the absence of transplant
attempts, the Bernier case shows the failure of harmonization
attempts as a mechanism of norm migration. The Canadian rail-
ways attempted to harmonize their labour practices with the U.S.
Railroad Regulations, but apparently ran up against a Canadian
jurisprudence that was not amenable to such harmonization. And
yet these cases are both sites at which the U.S. norms took hold. They
are pivotal in the so-called “development of the Canadian model” by
virtue of the approach that they adopt in deciding whether or not
employers have the right to unilaterally impose drug testing poli-
cies. As we shall see below103, this approach came to structure the
justification of drug testing in terms of the balancing of employers’
interests and the privacy rights of their employees. This “balancing
of interests test” became one of the cornerstones of the reasoning
behind Canadian model.
Before we look at the justification for testing under the Cana-
dian model, we will take a brief look at the other way in which drug
testing norms migrated from the U.S.: corporate personnel policies.
2. Migration of Drug Testing Norms by Corporate Policy
The migration of drug testing norms via the transportation indus-
try was relatively direct. The U.S. Railroad Regulations and the attend-
101 Id., p. 3, emphasis added.
102 Id., p. 4. See also, Provincial-American Transport, supra, note 96 (holding that
the company could not rely on the requirements of the U.S. regulations to ground
authority to impose periodic drug testing on its drivers). But see, Milazzo v.
Autocar Connaisseur Inc., (2003) 47 C.H.R.R. 468, where the Canadian Human
Rights Tribunal decided that the existence of the U.S. regulations justified impos-
ing testing on Canadian bus drivers.
103 Infra, s. 3.2.1.
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ant concept of “safety-sensitive positions” entered the Canadian legal
landscape through direct reference to the U.S. jurisprudence (as in
the Hutchinson and Keal decisions) or through their application to
Canadian-based transportation workers (as in the Bernier and Pro-
vincial-American Transport decisions). However, drug testing also
came to Canada indirectly through personnel policies adopted by
U.S. companies and then applied to employees of their Canadian
operations. This phenomenon was noted in the occupational med-
icine field:
“There is some concern that the drug testing policies developed in
the United States are, in effect, being imposed upon Canada due to
the prominent role of American-owner industry in the Canadian
economy and the US rules for transportation workers that apply to
cross-border transport, despite much lower frequencies of positive
testing that indicate that the problem of drugs in the workplace is
vanishingly small in Canada.”104
Tracing this process is significantly more difficult than in the
case of the Railroad Regulations. In the latter case, we are dealing with
an explicit body of state law adopted, promulgated and published in
such a way as to allow for its easy identification and tracking. Cor-
porate policies are, on the other hand, generally adopted without
public consultation and promulgated by employers in multiple
ways. They are rarely published; when they are, it is in a decentral-
ized fashion lacking the citation and referencing apparatus of state
law105.
This is not to say that corporate policies are less important or
have fewer effects than state law. Insofar as the legitimacy and effi-
cacy of laws are related to their ability to structure expectations,
create obligations and implement sanctions, corporate drug policies
104 T.L. GUIDOTTI et al., “Occupational medicine in Canada in 1996”, (1997) 47-1
Occupational Medicine 45, 50. See also G. CHARLES, Mandatory Drug Testing in
Employment, LL.M. Thesis, Dalhousie University, December 1999, p. 29, claim-
ing “In Canada, subsidiaries of American companies have been requesting drug
tests from their employees for years.”
105 One way in which the norms that are expressed in corporate policies migrate
across organizations is though the publication of “model policies” in the spe-
cialized human resources or management literature. In the context of drug test-
ing, see e.g. Barbara BUTLER, “Developing a Company Alcohol and Drug Policy”,
(1994) 2-3 Can. Lab. L.J. 484.
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are arguably more important than state law106. This does not, how-
ever, entail that they are as visible from an outside perspective.
Thus, what we can discover about such policies is largely, though
not exclusively, determined by the extent to which they come into
contact with state law. The vast majority of this contact is through
litigation instituted before adjudicative bodies of the state.
While the scope of this phenomenon is therefore difficult to
establish, it is clear that many Canadian production facilities either
had drug testing policies imposed upon them by their American
head offices or parent corporations, or were required by their U.S.
counterparts to formulate their own policies107.
Note that from the perspective of the companies themselves, the
migration of U.S. norms could be described in terms of transplant
(U.S. parent companies imposing testing regimes on their Canadian
operations) or harmonization (Canadian subsidiaries adopting test-
ing in order to harmonize their personnel policies with their U.S.
parent companies). But neither of these positions fully explains the
phenomenon. If, as I suggest, we take the adoption of the U.S. norms
by Canadian subsidiaries as “points of infection” then we are not
left without an explanation for their adoption by other companies
that are not engaged in transplant or harmonization. In other words,
the viral metaphor allows us to ask the question of how the norms
spread throughout industries after they initially took hold.
B. Principles Regulating Testing Under the Model
The early Canadian cases dealt virtually exclusively with indi-
vidual grievances filed by employees who had been disciplined after
either “failing” a drug test or refusing to submit to one. To the extent
that the legality of testing per se was touched upon, it was as an
incidental question to the main issue before the board of arbitra-
tion. The later cases cited in Imperial Oil as constituting the Cana-
dian model dealt directly with employers’ right to test in general.
106 On the idea that corporate personnel policies relating to drug testing constitute
a quasi-autonomous legal order see Andrée LAJOIE, Pouvoir disciplinaire et tests
de dépistage de drogues en milieu de travail: illégalité ou pluralisme, Cowans-
ville, Éditions Yvon Blais, 1995.
107 See e.g. Trimac Transportation Services – Bulk Systems and T.C.U. (Re), (1999)
88 L.A.C. (4th) 237.
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This appears to be the result of two interrelated processes. First,
faced with a jurisprudence that required drug testing to be done in
accordance with explicit policies, employers who hadn’t already for-
malized their approach to drug testing did so by adopting detailed
policies. Second, there was a change in union litigation strategy;
rather than challenge drug-related disciplinary action on a case-by-
case basis, unions began to overtly challenge the legitimacy of drug
testing in the workplace by filing collective grievances as soon as
such policies were adopted.
1. Privacy Rights and the “Balancing of Interests” Test
Though the primary basis of the initial policy challenges was an
alleged violation of employees’ privacy rights, they were not grounded
in human rights law. Instead, unions framed their arguments in
terms of traditional principles of labour law restricting employers’
authority to unilaterally promulgate personnel policies in workplaces
governed by a collective agreement108. The applicable labour law prin-
ciples were derived from the 1965 KVP case109, which continues to
be cited in drug testing decisions that apply the Canadian model110.
In KVP, Arbitrator Robinson described the principles as follows:
“A rule unilaterally introduced by the company, and not subse-
quently agreed to by the union, must satisfy the following requi-
sites:
1. It must not be inconsistent with the collective agreement.
108 This was due to the fact that it was already well-established that application of
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms is limited to government action
and thus does not apply in private litigation. The principle was confirmed by the
Supreme Court in RWDSU v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573, see esp.
¶ 26 and ff. The Charter is not considered in Hutchinson, supra, note 89, nor in
Keal, supra, note 89, nor in Bernier, supra, note 100. In Provincial-American Trans-
port, supra, note 96, the arbitrator clearly states that “[t]his is a case to which
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms does not apply.” On the role of
the Charter in drug testing cases see Ben HOVIUS, Syd J. USPRICH & R.M. SOLOMON,
“Employee Drug Testing and the Charter”, (1994) 2(3) Can. Lab. L.J. 345.
109 Re Lumber & Sawmill Workers’ Union, Loc. 2537 and KVP Co., (1965) 16 L.A.C.
73 (Robinson).
110 See e.g. Imperial Oil, supra, note 3; Re Weyerhaeuser Company Ltd. and Com-
munications, Energy and Paperworkers Union, Local 447 (Roberto), (2006) 154
L.A.C. (4th) 3 (Sims); Re Bantrel Constructors Co. and U.A., Loc. 488, (2007) 162
L.A.C. (4th) 122 (Smith).
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2. It must not be unreasonable.
3. It must be clear and unequivocal.
4. It must be brought to the attention of the employee affected
before the company can act on it.
5. The employee concerned must have been notified that a breach
of such rule could result in his discharge if the rule is used as a
foundation for discharge.
6. Such rule should have been consistently enforced by the com-
pany from the time it was introduced.”111
The first drug testing case to explicitly apply KVP was rendered
by Arbitrator Picher in the Bernier case, in which he found that the
fifth principle had been violated, namely that CN employees had not
been informed that “violation of the American regulation could result
in the termination of [their] services, not only in the United States
but also in Canada”112.
But it is the second KVP criterion, that of reasonableness, which
allowed for the privacy rights of employees to become a legally cogni-
zable issue in the context of labour arbitration. In Provincial-American
Transport, Arbitrator Brent made the analogy between employee
searches and drug testing, as follows:
“There is no doubt that a carrier using the public highways must
be very sensitive to safety, and that impaired drivers can jeopard-
ize the lives and property of many others… Canadian jurisdictions
have made clear policy statements indicating a desire to rid the
roads of impaired drivers. Having said that, the public good does
not necessarily require a wholesale disregard for personal liberty.
Is there any reason then to treat the issue of drug and alcohol test-
ing as being so different from searches to prevent employee theft –
cases where the interests of the employer in safeguarding his prop-
erty and the privacy interests of the employees have been balanced
for years? We think not.”113
He went on to determine that the policy of universal drug testing
was unreasonable “even accepting the obvious safety concerns”,
111 Re Lumber & Sawmill Workers’ Union, Loc. 2537 and KVP Co., supra, note 109.
112 Supra, note 100, p. 3.
113 Supra, note 96, 424, emphasis added.
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since there was no evidence of a drug problem in the company nor
that existing mechanisms for ensuring safety were unsatisfactory114.
Here we see an early reference to the structure of justification
that would come to govern a key component of the Canadian model.
The reasonableness of drug testing policies depends on the balancing
of employees’ privacy interests with the interests of the employer.
Absent evidence that the policy is required to further the employer’s
interests, the privacy interest of the employees prevails. The unstated
difference between employee searches and drug testing is the
employer interest that is at stake; in the first case it is “safeguarding
his property” whereas in the second case it is promoting safety.
This characterization of the balancing of interests test as weigh-
ing employees’ privacy against safety was clearly set out in the Esso
Petroleum case, which cites Provincial-American Transport115. Curi-
ously, however, the larger part of the decision is guided by the deci-
sions of the U.S. Supreme Court in Skinner116 and Von Raab117. In
both of those cases, the Court’s decision judged the permissibility of
a practice by “balancing its intrusion on the individual’s Fourth
Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmen-
tal interests”118. Even more curiously, Arbitrator MacAlpine’s reli-
ance on the U.S. jurisprudence has been systematically evacuated
from the conventional story of the development of the Canadian
model. MacAlpine’s decision and the balancing of interest test in
particular are commonly cited as key elements of a uniquely Cana-
dian jurisprudence119. 
Finally, we can see how the “balancing of interest” test arrived
in Canada through various “points of infection”. In addition to the
114 Id., 425.
115 Re Esso Petroleum Canada and Communications, Energy & Paperworkers Union,
Local 614, [1994] B.C.C.A.A.A. No. 244, 56 L.A.C. (4th) 440 (McAlpine), [here-
inafter Esso Petroleum, cited to B.C.C.A.A.A.]. Note that Esso is a property of
Imperial Oil.
116 Supra, note 76.
117 Supra, note 79.
118 Skinner, supra, note 76, 619 (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648).
119 This can be at least partially explained by the fact that the case is usually cited
to a summary found in the ubiquitous L.A.C. (“Labour Arbitration Cases”)
reporter rather than to the full text version that appears in B.C.C.A.A.A. (“Brit-
ish Columbia Collective Agreement Arbitration Awards” – a Quicklaw database).
12-Revue.book  Page 693  Vendredi, 20. novembre 2009  2:00 14
(2009) 43 R.J.T. 651694
explicit reference to the U.S. jurisprudence by Arbitrator MacAlpine
relies on the Hutchinson case (both directly, and by citing Provincial-
American Transport, which in turn relies on Hutchinson). Recall,
that in Hutchinson, which was rendered prior to the U.S. Supreme
Court decisions, Arbitrator Picher describes the American Railroad
Regulations as striking a balance between a railroad’s interest in safe
operations and employee privacy rights120.
The outcome of Esso Petroleum, with regard to drug testing was:
• Mandatory random testing prescribed for safety-sensitive
employees is acceptable in the context of rehabilitation but
only for a reasonable period of time.
• Mandatory random testing prescribed for safety-sensitive
employees is otherwise unacceptable.
• Mandatory testing of all employees after a significant work
accident, incident or near miss is acceptable.
• Mandatory testing of all employees on the basis of reasonable
and probable grounds is acceptable121.
Note that these are precisely the four circumstances under which
testing is allowed in the Canadian model as it was described by
Arbitrator Picher in the Imperial Oil case122. They are also virtually
identical to the testing circumstances set out in the U.S. Railroad
Regulations in 1987.
The balancing of interest test and its consequences continue to
apply relatively unchanged123.
120 See text accompanying note 91, supra.
121 Esso Petroleum, supra, note 115, ¶ 189.
122 Supra, note 3.
123 Canadian National Railway Co. and C.A.W.-Canada (Re), (2000) 95 L.A.C. (4th)
341 (M.G. Picher) [hereinafter CN & CAW] (balancing of interests test justifies
reasonable cause and post-accident testing for risk-sensitive employees); Re
Fording Coal Ltd. and United Steelworkers of America, Local 7884 (Shypitka
grievance), (2001) 94 L.A.C. (4th) 354 (Hope) (balancing of interests test justifies
subjecting an employee with a history of drug problems to random testing for a
period of two years); Re Fording Coal Ltd. and United Steelworkers of America,
Local 7884 (Cryderman grievance), (2003) 119 L.A.C. (4th) 165 (Devine) (balanc-
ing of interests test justifies post-incident testing for those in safety-sensitive
positions, but only if an investigation has first ruled out mechanical or environ-
mental causes); ADM Agri-Industries Ltd. v. National Automobile, Aerospace,
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2. The Curious Case of Privacy in Québec
Québec is unique among the Canadian provinces in the protec-
tion that it affords privacy interests. Unlike the various human rights
codes in the other provinces124, Québec’s Charter of Human Rights
and Freedoms125 offers specific protection of the right to privacy. The
Québec Charter provides:
4. Every person has a right to the safeguard of his dignity, hon-
our and reputation.
5. Every person has a right to the respect for his private life. 
9. Every person has a right to non-disclosure of confidential infor-
mation…
9.1 In exercising his fundamental freedoms and rights, a person
shall maintain a proper regard for democratic values, public
order and the general well-being of the citizens of Québec. 
In this respect, the scope of the freedoms and rights, and limits
to their exercise, may be fixed by law.
Thus, unlike the common law provinces and the federal jurisdic-
tion, from which the majority of the arbitration jurisprudence dealing
with drug and alcohol policies emanates, Québec has a statutory
scheme that sets out the content of the right to privacy and the con-
ditions under which it can be balanced with other rights.
124 In British Columbia, see the Human Rights Code, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 2; in Alberta,
see the Human Rights, Citizenship and Multiculturalism Act, R.S.A. 1980, c. H-14;
in Saskatchewan, see the Human Rights Code, S.S. 1979, c. S-24.1; in Manitoba,
see the Human Rights Code, S.M. 1987, c. H-175 (as amended); in Ontario, see
the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19; in New Brunswick, see the Human
Rights Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, c. H-11; in Nova Scotia, see the Human Rights Act,
R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 214; in Prince Edward Island, see the Human Rights Act,
R.S.P.E.I. 1988 c. H-12; in Newfoundland and Labrador, see the Human Rights
Code, R.S.N.L. 1990, c. H-14 (as amended).
125 R.S.Q., c. C-12.
Transportation and General Workers’ Union of Canada (CAW-Canada), Local 195
(Substance Abuse Policy Grievance), [2004] C.L.A.D. No. 610 (Springate) (bal-
ancing of interest test justifies post-incident, reasonable cause, and post-
rehabilitation testing). See also the four awards listed by Arbitrator Picher in
Imperial Oil, supra, note 3, ¶ 100. See also Donald J.M. BROWN and David M.
BEATTY, Canadian Labour Arbitration, 4th ed., Aurora, Canada Law Book, loose-
leaf updated Nov. 2007, section 7:6152.
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Insofar as the Québec Charter grants quasi-constitutional pri-
vacy rights and not common law privacy interests, it can be argued
that the burden an employer in Québec must meet in order to jus-
tify drug and alcohol testing is stricter than that the “balancing of
interests” test set out in the arbitral jurisprudence from the rest of
Canada. The few cases on drug testing from Québec, however, do not
appear to diverge significantly from the Canadian model126. 
The Québec Court of Appeal recently confirmed this trend in the
Goodyear case. In that case, the union appealed a decision of the
Superior Court refusing an application for judicial review of an arbi-
tral award that confirmed the employer’s right to subject employees
in “safety-sensitive positions”127 to random and unannounced drug
tests. The Court applied the Oakes test128, and found that such test-
ing was adopted in the pursuit of a legitimate objective but that there
were less intrusive ways of achieving this objective129. Random test-
ing was therefore not allowed.
126 See e.g. Teamsters Québec, section locale 973 et Aliments Ultima inc., D.T.E.
2004T-1115 (T.A.); SCEP s.l. 143 et Goodyear Canada Inc. (April 12, 2005, Arbi-
trator D. Tremblay, unreported) aff’d Section locale 143 du Syndicat canadien
des communications, de l’énergie et du papier c. Tremblay, 2006 QCCS 2128,
[2006] R.J.D.T. 617, D.T.E. 2006T-449, quashed in part on appeal : Section locale
143 du Syndicat canadien des communications, de l’énergie et du papier c. Good-
year Canada Inc., 2007 QCCA 1686 [hereinafter Goodyear]. Full disclosure: I
was one of the attorneys who acted for the union in the Goodyear case.
127 In French, “postes à risque élevé” or literally “high risk positions”.
128 Goodyear, supra, note 126 (appeal), ¶ 18. In using the Oakes test to determine
the scope of legitimate violations of fundamental rights by private parties, rather
than the state, the Court implicitly refused to apply the distinction set out by
the Supreme Court of Canada in Syndicat Northcrest v. Anselem, [2004] 2 S.C.R.
551 and Multani c. Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys, [2006] S.C.R.
256. In those cases, the Supreme Court distinguished the first and second par-
agraphs of s. 9.1. of the Québec Charter and found that the Oakes test is not the
applicable standard in cases where the alleged violation of a fundamental right
is not perpetrated by the state.
129 Id., ¶ 19 and 23-32. The Court skips the part of the Oakes test in which it must
be demonstrated that there exists a rational connection between the objective
(reducing workplace accidents) and the means employed (drug testing). It
appears, however, that the absence of such a connection is in fact the true basis
for their decision (see esp. ¶ 25 where the Court states: “Bien que cette usine
présente un mauvais dossier en matière d’accidents du travail, aucun lien n’a
été établi entre cette situation et la consommation d’alcool et de drogues.”).
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In the final two paragraphs of the judgement, in what is arguably
an obiter remark, the Court cites the passages from Imperial Oil that
refer to the “Canadian model”, stating that it provides an “interest-
ing comparison”130.
C. Discrimination Against the Addicted:
Real and Perceived Handicaps
An important element of any drug testing regime is the conse-
quences that flow from a positive test. Early Canadian arbitration
cases framed this question in terms of the general principles gov-
erning discipline in the workplace. These principles had already
been applied to cases of employee of consumption and/or impairment
at work, which existed prior to the implementation of drug test-
ing131.
With the advent of mass drug testing in the absence of reason-
able suspicion of consumption or impairment, however, concerns
began to be raised that employers were thereby discriminating against
drug-dependent employees. The various human rights commissions
130 Id., ¶ 33-34. This passage is disconnected from the rest of the judgement and
plays no explicit role in Court’s reasoning. This absence of explanation leads me
to believe that the sole purpose of the citation is to demonstrate that, even if the
reasoning applicable in Québec is somewhat different than elsewhere in Canada,
the result is perfectly in stride with the “Canadian model”.
131 See, e.g. Re Brotherhood of Electrical workers Local 911 and Windsor Utilities
Commission, (1958) 8 LAC 328 (Honrahan) (drinking during lunch break does
not justify suspension if the employee was not impaired at work); Sudbury Mine
Workers, Local 598 and Falconbridge Nickel Mines Ltd., (1962) 12 L.A.C. 270
(Thompson) (discipline is only justified if the employee’s impairment renders
him or her unable to perform duties in a satisfactory way); Re Dominion Stores
Ltd. and Retail, Wholesale & Department Store Union, Local 414, (1976) 16 L.A.C.
(2d) 7 (Hinnegan) (possession of marijuana on company premises justifies a
four-month suspension but not discharge); Firestone Steel Products of Canada
and United Automobile Workers, Local 27, (1977) 17 L.A.C. (2d) 185 (Rayner)
(impairment by marijuana while at work justifies discharge); Re Indalloy, Divi-
sion of Indal Ltd. and United Steelworkers, Local 2729, (1979) 22 L.A.C. (2d) 202
(Kennedy) (possession of marijuana with the intent to consume it at work does
not justify discharge but does justify a five-month suspension); Re Steel Com-
pany of Canada Ltd. and United Steelworkers, (1979) 14 L.A.C. (2d) 405 (Rayner)
(marijuana consumption at work justifies discharge); Re Air Canada and Inter-
national Assoc. of Machinists, (1976) 10 L.A.C. (2d) 346 (Morin) (habitual off-duty
marijuana use is not grounds for discipline absent evidence of impairment at
work).
12-Revue.book  Page 697  Vendredi, 20. novembre 2009  2:00 14
(2009) 43 R.J.T. 651698
were apparently the first to raise this issue132. In Provincial-Ameri-
can Transport, Arbitrator Brent remarked:
“This is a case to which the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
does not apply. Further, we were not cited any decisions of either
the Canadian Human Rights Commission or the Ontario Human
Rights Commission regarding drug testing. Based on the policy
papers from those bodies which were filed with us, it would appear
that their view is that evidence of a particular problem would be
required before drug and alcohol testing would be countenanced
under existing human rights legislation.”133
The application of anti-discrimination law to drug-testing policy
was eventually decided by the Federal Court of Appeal in the 1998 TD
Bank case134 and the Ontario Court of Appeal in 2000 Entrop case135.
As we shall see, these cases deploy different reasoning to come to the
same conclusions as the arbitral jurisprudence. Unsurprisingly, the
decisions were easily integrated in the Canadian model.
1. Human Rights Decisions by the Higher Courts
The TD Bank case arose after the Toronto Dominion Bank adopted
a new drug testing policy in 1990. In his decision, Roberston, J.A.
describes the policy as follows:
“[The policy] requires all new and returning employees to submit to
a urine drug test within 48 hours of accepting an offer of employ-
ment. This requirement is printed on the Bank’s application for
employment form which states that it is a condition of employment
that a person undergo drug testing for “illegal substances”…
132 See e.g. CANADIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, The Canadian Human Rights Com-
mission Policy on Mandatory Drug Testing, Ottawa, CHRC Research & Policy
Branch, 1987 [Policy 88-1]; ONTARIO HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, Policy on Drug and
Alcohol Testing (1996); Claire BERNARD, La compatibilité avec la Charte québé-
coise des tests de drogue en emploi, Québec, Commission des droits de la per-
sonne et droits de la jeunesse [document officiel Cat.2.120-12.13], 1998.
133 Supra, note 96, 426.
134 Canada (Human Rights Commission) v. Toronto-Dominion Bank, 1998 CanLII
8112 (F.C.A.), [1998] 4 F.C. 205, 163 D.L.R. (4th) 193, 32 C.H.R.R. 261, 38
C.C.E.L. (2d) 8 [hereinafter TD Bank].
135 Entrop v. Imperial Oil Limited, 2000 CanLII 16800 (Ont.C.A.), 50 O.R. (3d) 18,
189 D.L.R. (4th) 14, 2 C.C.E.L. (3d) 19, 37 C.H.R.R. 481, 137 O.A.C. 15 [here-
inafter Entrop, cited to CanLII].
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New or returning employees who refuse to submit to the drug test
are dismissed for failing to comply with a condition of employment.
Employees who test positive and are drug dependent, may lose
their employment if they refuse to take advantage of the rehabili-
tation services made available to them or if rehabilitation efforts
prove unsuccessful. So-called casual users of illicit substances,
that is non-dependent drug users, may also lose their employment
if they persist in using such drugs after having tested positive on at
least three occasions…”136
The Canadian Civil Liberties Association (the “CCLA”) saw this
as a violation of the Canadian Human Rights Act137, which specifi-
cally prohibits employment discrimination on the grounds of “…
previous or existing dependence on alcohol or a drug”138. The CCLA
filed a complaint with the Canadian Human Rights Commission,
which in turn seized the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal. The case
eventually made its way to the Federal Court of Appeal via a deci-
sion by a Federal Court motions judge on an application for judicial
review of the Tribunal’s decision.
Robertson, J.A., found that the policy was discriminatory, since
“[a]n employment policy aimed at ensuring a work environment free
of illegal drug use must necessarily impact negatively on those who
are drug dependent”139. Furthermore, the discrimination could not
be justified because it was neither reasonably necessary, nor ration-
ally connected to job performance140.
136 TD Bank, supra, note 134, ¶ 6-7.
137 R.S.C. 1985, c. H-6. The reason that federal legislation applies is that banks,
including their employment relationships, fall under the federal jurisdiction by
virtue of s. 91(15) of the Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, reprinted
in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 5.
138 Id. The definition of disability is found at as. 10. Section 3(1) includes disability
as a “prohibited ground” of discrimination, and s. 10 sets out the definition of a
“discriminatory practice” in employment. 
139 TD Bank, supra note 134, ¶ 24. Note that the judgement contains three different
sets of reasons. Robertson, J.A., found that the policy was directly discrimina-
tory and in the alternative that it constituted unjustified indirect discrimina-
tion; McDonald, J.A., found that the policy constituted unjustified indirect
discrimination; Isaac, C.J., dissented, finding that if the policy were indirectly
discriminatory it was justified on the grounds that being free from drugs is a
bona fide occupational requirement.
140 The “reasonably necessary” and “rational connection” tests were, at the time of
the judgement, distinct tests used to determine whether a practice that is prima
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McDonald, J.A., in his concurring opinion, found that the policy
constituted indirect discrimination since the neutral rule (“employ-
ees must be drug-free”) had more serious consequences for a group
that is protected under the Human Rights Act (drug dependent
employees)141. He continues, finding that such a policy could be
truly neutral (i.e. not cause adverse effects to a protected group) in
some circumstances. The circumstances he cites are cases where
the policy is implemented in a “safety sensitive industry”. He writes:
“For instance, a policy aimed at achieving a drug and alcohol free
work place can be neutral if it is concerned with work performance
and seeks to rehabilitate those whose work performance has been
affected as a result of their drug dependency. Indeed, drug testing
in safety sensitive industries is allowed and pursued. The concern,
therefore, should be to ensure that the policy is designed to meet the
requirements of the CHA [Canadian Human Rights Act] rather than
with banning these policies altogether…
It is relatively easy to imagine a situation where a drug testing policy
would likely be upheld: one is in a safety sensitive industry that has
a policy of drug testing for cause (where an employee’s work per-
formance has been affected by drugs.) Having established this is a
valid BFOR [bona fide occupational requirement] defence, there is no
duty to accommodate: the disabled person can be dismissed.”142
Thus, in a case involving discrimination, where the governing
legal principles and applicable legislation are radically different from
those applicable to privacy in the context of a collective bargaining
relationship, the Federal Court of Appeal comes to precisely the
same conclusion as the arbitration jurisprudence: drug testing is
justified when it is implemented in a safety sensitive industry, and
then, only for cause.
A similar result was arrived at in the Entrop case143. In that
case, Imperial Oil’s drug and alcohol policy was challenged by Mr.
141 TD Bank, supra, note 134, ¶ 4.
142 Id., ¶ 11-12, emphasis added.
143 Supra, note 135. The relationship between Entrop and TD Bank is complex. The
Ontario Human Rights Commission Board of Inquiry had rendered an initial
decision in Entrop by the time that the TD Bank decision was rendered, and that
facie discriminatory is nevertheless justified. Since the Supreme Court aban-
doned the distinction between direct discrimination and indirect or “adverse
effect” discrimination in Meiorin, supra, note 4, there is now only one test. 
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Entrop, who filed a complaint with the Ontario Human Rights Com-
mission. The facts that led to the litigation were simple:
“The respondent Martin Entrop suffered from alcohol abuse in the
early 1980s. Although he had not had a drink for over seven years,
because he worked in what Imperial Oil classified as a safety-sen-
sitive job, the Policy required him to disclose his previous alcohol
abuse problem to management. When he disclosed it, he was auto-
matically reassigned to another job.”144
The Board of Inquiry appointed by the Ministry of Labour
expanded the scope of its inquiry to include with all aspects of the
policy, ultimately deciding that policy’s provisions for drug and alco-
hol testing were in violation of the Ontario Human Rights Code145.
By the time it had reached the Ontario Court of Appeal, the ques-
tion of the legality of testing had become the primary issue.
Though the Ontario Human Rights Code does not specifically
reference addiction in the way that the Canadian Human Rights Act
does, the Court upheld the Board’s finding that substance abuse is
a handicap. Furthermore, the Ontario Human Rights Code, prohib-
its discrimination against anyone who “has or has had, or is believed
to have or have had” a handicap146. This caused the court to remark:
“Thus, though the social drinker and casual drug user are not sub-
stance abusers and, therefore, not handicapped, Imperial Oil
believes them to be substance abusers for the purpose of the Pol-
icy. In other words, Imperial Oil believes that any person testing
positive on a pre-employment drug test or a random drug or alco-
hol test is a substance abuser… Imperial Oil applies sanctions to
any person testing positive – either refusing to hire, disciplining or
terminating the employment of that person – on the assumption
144 Entrop, supra, note 135, ¶ 2.
145 R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended. Compare Alberta (Human Rights and Citizen-
ship Commission) v. Kellogg Brown & Root (Canada) Company, 2007 ABCA 426
(CanLII), where the Alberta Court of Appeal refused to declare illegal a drug test-
ing policy on the grounds that the individual complainant was not handicapped
and that the Human Rights Panel was not validly seized of a general complaint
that allowed for a decision on the general validity of the impugned policy.
146 Id., at ss. 5(1) and 10.
decision is cited by the Federal Court of Appeal. However, the procedural com-
plexities of Entrop (where the Board rendered eight distinct decisions) resulted
in the appeal being heard after TD Bank was rendered. So TD Bank is cited in
the Ontario Court of Appeal’s decision in Entrop.
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that the person is likely to be impaired at work currently or in the
future, and thus not “fit for duty.” Therefore, persons testing pos-
itive on an alcohol or drug test – perceived or actual substance
abusers – are adversely affected by the Policy. The Policy provi-
sions for pre-employment drug testing and for random alcohol and
drug testing are, therefore, prima facie discriminatory. Imperial Oil
bears the burden of showing that they are bona fide occupational
requirements.”
The “bona fide occupational requirement” test to which the Court
refers here had undergone some refinement since TD Bank, where
two distinct tests (the “reasonably necessary” test and “rational con-
nection” test) were applied147. These tests were premised on the dis-
tinction between direct and indirect (or adverse effect) discrimination;
a distinction that was jettisoned. Since 1999, the courts apply a
“unified approach” that imposes a single test to determine whether
a prima facie discriminatory employment standard is justified: 
“An employer may justify the impugned standard by establishing
on the balance of probabilities:
(1) that the employer adopted the standard for a purpose ration-
ally connected to the performance of the job;
(2) that the employer adopted the particular standard in an hon-
est and good faith belief that it was necessary to the fulfilment
of that legitimate work-related purpose; and
(3) that the standard is reasonably necessary to the accomplish-
ment of that legitimate work-related purpose. To show that the
standard is reasonably necessary, it must be demonstrated
that it is impossible to accommodate individual employees
sharing the characteristics of the claimant without imposing
undue hardship upon the employer.”148
In Entrop, the Court found that the purpose of the policy was to
promote workplace safety and that reducing workplace impairment
was rationally connected to that objective. It also found that Impe-
rial Oil honestly believed that its policy was necessary to meet this
objective. The real question for the Court was thus whether drug
testing was reasonably necessary.
147 Meiorin, supra, note 4. See also British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehi-
cles) v. British Columbia (Council of Human Rights), [1999] 3 S.C.R. 868, 181
D.L.R. (4th) 385 [hereinafter Grismer].
148 Meiorin, supra, note 4, ¶ 54.
12-Revue.book  Page 702  Vendredi, 20. novembre 2009  2:00 14
THE DRUG TESTING VIRUS 703
The Court found that random testing was not reasonably nec-
essary for the simple reason that urinalysis drug testing is unable to
detect current impairment. Since a positive test tells the employer
nothing as to the employees’ capacity to do the job safely, testing
cannot be reasonably necessary to promote workplace safety149.
Furthermore, termination of employment after a positive test is far
more drastic than is necessary – Imperial Oil had not shown that it
was impossible to adjust its sanctions in order to accommodate drug-
dependent employees150. Both of these arguments were also applied
by the Court to pre-employment testing151. 
The Court also endorsed the Board’s finding that testing based
on reasonable suspicion and after an accident or incident (as part of
a “larger assessment”) were justified152.
2. Integration in the Model by Arbitrators
The conclusion of TD Bank and Entrop is ultimately that random
drug testing and mass pre-employment screening are unjustified
under anti-discrimination statutes. Both, however, allow testing for
employees in safety-sensitive positions. Entrop specifically sets out
that such testing is allowable on the basis of reasonable suspicion
and as part of a post-incident or accident investigation. Once again,
we see that testing is allowed under the same conditions as the ini-
tial U.S. Railroad regulations. It was therefore easy for the “new” anti-
discrimination reasoning governing drug testing to be integrated into
the Canadian model, which itself is basically identical to the U.S.
system. Arguably then, the structure of justification in Canadian
human rights law is a feature of Canadian law that makes it an ame-
nable host to the drug testing virus; or conversely, Canadian human
rights law does not immunize the legal system against the drug test-
ing virus.
This process of integration occurred rapidly in the years follow-
ing TD Bank and Entrop. In CN & CAW153, Arbitrator Picher cites TD
149 Entrop, supra, note 135, ¶ 99.
150 Id., ¶ 100-102.
151 Id., ¶ 99.
152 Id., ¶ 114.
153 Supra, note 123.
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Bank at length, as well as the lower tribunal rulings in Entrop. Hear-
ings in the case ended two days prior to the release of the Court of
Appeal decision in Entrop. By the time Arbitrator Picher rendered
Imperial Oil, the reasoning on discrimination was clearly described
as a key component of the Canadian model.
*
* *
As we have seen, the Canadian model, which appears to develop
over a period of twenty years, remains virtually static in terms of the
conditions under which it allows for drug testing. It also maps quite
closely the model for testing adopted in the U.S., especially with
regard to the role that “safety-sensitive” positions or industries play
in its justification.
One of my central arguments has been that this similarity is not
a matter of accident, nor a simple contingent result of two relatively
similar legal systems dealing with the same subject matter. Rather,
the norms of the Canadian model migrated from the U.S. at multiple
points of contact and then spread across the Canadian jurispru-
dence. I proposed the metaphor of a viral infection to describe this
process of migration. This provides a more convincing explanation
than a description that relies on transplant of the American norms
or efforts to harmonize U.S. and Canadian law. I insist, however, that
at this stage, the viral explanation is a metaphor; it is neither a
model nor a theory. Recently, a small number of other authors have
also mobilized the viral metaphor to describe the migration of legal
norms154, but – to my knowledge – it has not been systematized. It
remains to be seen whether the analytical tools of epidemiology can
be systematically brought to bear on the problem of the migration of
legal norms.
The viral metaphor allows us to pose the question as to the suit-
ability of the “host” legal system as an environment for the migrating
norms, though admittedly harmonization and transplant explana-
tions allow for similar reflection. For instance, the “balancing of
interests” test that constitutes one prong of the Canadian model, is
154 See Spencer Weber WALLER, “The Chicago School Virus” (2007), working paper
available at <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1017882>. See also, Gil GRANTMORE, “The
Phages of American Law”, (2002) 36 U. C. Davis L. Rev. 455; Richard Michael
FISHL, “The Epidemiology of Critique”, (2003) 57 U. Miami L. Rev. 475.
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undeniably a direct descendent of the U.S. jurisprudence (and Arbi-
trator Picher’s interpretation of the Railroad Regulations). The trans-
position of the reasoning, however, was apparently facilitated by the
existence of a similar doctrine in the Canadian arbitral jurispru-
dence governing employee searches. The other prong, the “bona fide
occupational requirement” test, is clearly derived from Canadian
human rights jurisprudence. What is striking, however, is that they
lead to the same result in terms of what kind of testing can be imposed
on whom and when.
One aspect of the viral metaphor that I have not explored, but
that bears further analysis, is the importance of carriers. While the
potential for transmission will depend in part on the hospitality of
the “host” legal system to the migrating norms, it will also depend on
having an amenable carrier. Paying increased attention to the car-
rier allows one to shift the focus from legal structure to legal agency.
Astute readers will have noticed that a large proportion of the juris-
prudence that constitutes the Canadian model was rendered by
Arbitrator Picher. This raises the question as to whether a favour-
able predisposition towards or familiarity with American law could
have made him a particularly efficient carrier. As it turns out, before
becoming an arbitrator, Picher pursued graduate work in law at
Harvard. I am not suggesting an explanation based purely on the
psychology of legal actors, but merely pointing out that a satisfying
description of the migration of legal norms using the viral metaphor
must account for the role of carriers. 
Another datum to be explained is the extent to which a norm fails
to migrate. For instance, one important distinction between the
Canadian model and the current norms governing drug testing in
the U.S. is that in the former random testing is unacceptable, whereas
in the latter it is allowed. This can be explained by the fact that the
key moments in the migration of the drug testing norms occurred
before random testing was adopted in the U.S. This tends to indi-
cate that the migration was not continuous, but rather stopped (or
at least diminished) once the number of Canadian decisions was suf-
ficient to ground an autonomous jurisprudence. Keeping with the
viral metaphor, we can say that a different “strain” developed and
that it immunized the Canadian jurisprudence from further infec-
tion by the original virus. 
Though I have shown two ways in which this U.S. justification
became a reason for implementing testing in Canada, it remains
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unclear how the truth of the proposition that drug testing reduces
accidents came to be accepted. What little references exist to the
actual relationship between drug use and accidents in Canada appear
simply to defer to U.S. research. One possible explanation for this is
based on the way in which the model came to Canada. The relation-
ship between drug use and accidents – and the efficiency of drug
tests in reducing accidents – came to be true within the discourse of
the law in the U.S. It was legal discourse that migrated north and it
seems that this discourse brought its truths with it.
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